SLAF AND GOSL CAUGHT LYING AND MAKING BOGUS CLAIMS AGAIN:

LIES, MORE LIES AND DAMN LIES BY THE GOSL AND SLAF:
TAMILS FOR JUSTICE CHALLENGES THE SLAF TO RELEASE THE F-7 AIRCRAFT LOGS, AIR TRAFIC CONTROL RECORDS, PROVIDING TIMES OF TAKE OFF, AND RETURN LANDING, TIMES OF ENGAGING THE LTTE AIR FORCE (TAF)AIRCRAFT WITH AIR TO AIR MISSILE, EXACT LOCATION WITH CO-ORDINATES IN THE MULAITHEEVU DISTRICT, AND EXACT DISTANCE FROM THAT LOCATION TO THE KATUNAYAKE AIRPORT.

SLAF SHOULD ALSO RELEASE EXACT AIR SPEED, GROUND SPEED, WIND STRENGTH BOTH OUTWARD AND RETURN JOURNEY TO ENABLE INDEPENDENT AVIATORS TO CALCULATE THE TIMES, FLYING TIMES, TAXIING TIME, LOG ON AND LOG OFF TIMES, AND SIMPLY THE VERACITY OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT. (STATE TERRORIST).

THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO BRING CONFIDENCE WITH THE 21 MILLION POPULATION OF SRI LANKA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE RAJAPAKSE'S PROVE THEIR CREDIBILITY AND HONESTY, THAN BE CALLED A BUNCH OF LYING POLITICIANS.
THE LTTE AIRCRAFTS FLY 15 MILES EVERY 6 MINUTES, WHICH WOULD HAVE TAKEN ONLY 12 MINUTES OR LESS TO RETURN TO BASE. IT ONLY TAKES 2 MINUTES TO DROP THE TWO BOMBS AND NOT SIX MINUTES AS CLAIMED BY THE SLAF.
DO THE SINHALESE EXPECT US TO BELIEVE THAT SLAF PILOTS WERE READY TO TAKE OFF WITHIN 2-3 MINUTES OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE INDIANS (ENEMIES OF THE TAMILS AND CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT INDIA DESPITE THEIR HUMILIATING DEFEAT 2 DECADES AGO WITH THE IPKF) WHO WERE MANNING THE INDIAN GIFTED RADAR.

INDIA AND INDIANS NEED TO REMEMBER THAT EVERY THING AND EVERYBODY IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR. WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS SAUCE FOR THE GANDER, AND EVEN IF THE LTTE DO NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST SUCH ENEMIES OF EELAM, OTHER TAMILS MIGHT BE MOTIVATED AND COULD DECIDE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.
PEOPLE LIKE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS COL. HARIHARAN AND RAW MAN B. RAMAN, N RAM SHOULD TAKE SERIOUS NOTE OF THE RAMIFICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOUTH BLOCK'S DESPICABLE ACTIONS.

THE SRI LANKAN MEDIA WITHOUT BEING COWARDS SHOULD INTERVIEW THE 2 INDIANS, WHO MIGHT BE NOT YET "GOOD INDIANS " AS THE SAYING GOES IN AMERICA. -TAMILS FOR JUSTICE:
YES, THE TAMILS WILL BE SEEKING JUSTICE AND THEY CANNOT DEPEND ON WORLD COURTS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS, OR THE US JUDICIAL SYSTEM, GIVEN THE CROOKED AND GREEDY ATTORNEYS WWE HAVE IN WASHINGTON, WHO ARE SIMPLY UNETHICAL AND IMMORAL IN THEIR ACTIONS AND CONDUCT.


Eelam War’s first ‘dogfight’ clouds Wanni operation


On September 9, F-7s of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) which, to date, have been playing a minimal role in the fight against the LTTE, made quite an entry into the fray, by what the SLAF claims to be the first “kill” over Sri Lankan skies, since the end of World War II. Thus, last week marked the very first ‘dogfight’ or close quarters, mid-air battle, of the two-decade old Eelam War…

The time for excuses and belittling the LTTE’s nascent air wing has long passed. What started as an irritant high flying air force, has now evolved into a serious threat, which has constantly defied claims of the security establishment, that the threat from the Air Tigers is negligible and under control.

This week too, the “Air Tigers” made the headlines for the second week in a row, when they launched an attack on the Vavuniya Air Force base and the Security Forces (SF) headquarters located in close proximity. Even though the physical damage, as usual, was very minimal, the psychological and propaganda victory for the Tigers have been enormous, especially, with the Tamil Diaspora, which have been eagerly awaiting some good news from the battlefield. The LTTE air wing, which would have definitely been emboldened after their August attack on Trincomalee Eastern Naval headquarters, took to the air again, this time in support of a major ground assault led by a team of Black Tigers.

The LTTE used three of its deadliest assets in this combined attack, the dreaded Black Tigers, the most dedicated and well trained assault unit, their long range artillery and their latest addition, the Air Tigers unit. It is ironic that, even though it was the accuracy of the long range artillery guns of the Tigers which caused maximum damage to the SF, which was no doubt supported by ground operatives, who would have directed the artillery barrage to its targets, the LTTE aircraft grabbed the headlines again for their involvement in the operation.

The only solace for the SF was the claim that an SLAF F7-G jet had managed to shoot down one of the fleeing Tiger craft. This claim was later disputed by the Tigers, which claimed that all its aircraft, which took part in the Vavuniya operation, returned to base. The F7s, which are the Chinese built versions of the Soviet Mig-21s, were inducted to the SLAF in the 1990s, with initial reports of the LTTE acquiring air capability. However, these interceptors, designed for air to air combat, became redundant, because the need of the hour for the SLAF was ground attack planes in support of Army operations. Further, the missile systems required for air combat were not included in the F-7s, making them nothing more than trainer aircraft for the fighter pilots who were destined to fly the more advanced Kfir and Mig-27s.

However, all this changed with the LTTE’s adventurous display of air power in 2007. The SLAF F7s, now jointly produced by the Chinese and the Pakistanis, were overhauled in Pakistan, being fitted with radar to detect other aircraft and also air to air missiles. Night flying capability was also enhanced with a new batch of F7-G jets brought down from Pakistan last year.

On September 9, the F7s, which have so far been playing a minimalist role in the fight against the Tigers, made quite an entry into the fray, by what the SLAF claims to be the first “kill” over Sri Lankan skies, since the end of World War II.

According to SLAF sources, less than 10 minutes after the first of two Tiger aircraft were detected heading towards Vavuniya, three F-7s were airborne from Katunayake, a commendable task, considering the lag time required to achieve that feat, unless the aircraft are kept on full time preparedness for a scramble.

The Tiger aircraft were over the skies of the Vavuniya Air Force base and SF Headquarters for around six minutes, before turning back towards their base, believed to be relocated in the Mullaitivu jungle, since the fighting in the Wanni had threatened their original bases in Iranamadu. The 25 kilogram bombs they had dropped caused minimum damage with most of the death and destruction caused that morning being the result of 130mm artillery fired by the Tigers. These weapons, though less glamorous than the aircraft, have remarkable accuracy, even from a distance of around 27 km away. The artillery batteries of the LTTE, which include the 130mm and 120mm guns, pose an enormous threat to the advancing troops in the Wanni, even though more attention is now turned towards the spectacular air attacks.

The SLAF claims that one of its F-7 jets gave chase to the Tiger aircraft, while others were trying to locate their intended landing sites. The F-7 had taken out the Tiger plane over the Mulleiyaweli jungle south of Mullaitivu with a single missile, according to these same sources.

Similarly, when the Air Tigers bombed the Naval Dockyard in Trincomalee, on August 28, F-7s were scrambled from Katunayake to give chase to the aircraft. On that occasion, the Tiger aircraft got away, even though one of the F-7 pilots is reported to have spotted a rebel aircraft over the Mullaitivu jungles, flying just above the treetops.

The Air Tiger attack on Vavuniya and Trincomalee make two things clear. First, the radius of operation of the Tiger air fleet will most probably be limited to the immediate theatre of battle. With the advances in radar and the upgrading of the interceptor capability of the SLAF, it is unlikely that the Tigers will attempt to penetrate the air defences to attack positions in the south like Colombo, unless on a suicide mission. Therefore, the threat from the Tiger air wing will mainly be on the frontline troops operating in the Wanni and Jaffna areas, with military installations in Jaffna, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Mannar coming under threat; not to mention the valuable Naval assets in the form of large ships and troop carriers sailing from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai. Therefore, in such a scenario, the flight time of the Tiger aircraft will be minimal as seen in their attack on Vavuniya.

The second point to be made from the recent attacks is that, a mere interceptor defence is not enough to face the threat of the Tiger aircraft. This time around, it was apparent that the SLAF had its F-7s ready to scramble at a moment’s notice. Even if the claims of the SLAF to have shot down a Tiger plane, are to be accepted, it was done only after the planes had bombed their targets. If the Tiger aircraft managed to hit their intended target of the Indra 2 Radar based in Vavuniya, the story would have been a different one. Furthermore, in a future scenario, the Tigers may effectively use their air power against advancing troops in the Wanni, making their flight time minimal and a counter strike from the SLAF’s interceptors launched from Katunayake almost impossible, due to the critical time factor.

The need of the hour, therefore, is to strengthen the air defence capabilities of the troops operating from the forward areas of battle, rather than relying on the interceptors based hundreds of kilometres from the theatre of operation. The anti-aircraft guns mounted around the key installations in the North, Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Colombo and Katunayake have proved to be nothing but a fireworks display against the low flying Tiger aircraft, in the past.

It was after the Air Tigers attacked the Katunayake airbase on March 26, 2007, that it was revealed that a radar-guided anti-aircraft gun would have been more effective than the visually manoeuvred ones that were in place. Time and again, this hypothesis has been proven correct with the ground based anti aircraft batteries proving repeatedly futile, as the Tigers made successful sorties over key military installations. Another low cost, but effective proposition was, to induct Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMs) in the threatened areas. This would also minimise the reaction time to a Tiger aircraft threat and give ground troops facing the challenge of a low flying aircraft, an effective mode of counter attack.

It is now reported that the much talked of Mig-29 interceptors will be inducted into the SLAF before the end of the year. While this would definitely add to the SLAF’s Air-to-Air capability, at an enormous cost (it is estimated that one of these Mig 29s will cost around US$ 12-15 million and the SLAF is planning on acquiring five of these) whether they will be useful in a future scenario, where the LTTE will use its aircraft in support of its ground troops in the theatre of battle, remains to be seen.

It is no mean feat for a rebel movement to acquire, operate and maintain a fleet of aircraft, however primitive it may be. The LTTE has proven that, against all the odds, it is capable of pulling off a surprise attack, catching the Defence establishment unawares once again. If a remedy to this Tiger air menace is not found soon, it has the potential to nullify many of the SLAF successes in the recent phase of fighting in Eelam War IV.

****
From Sunday Times:

Situation report
Vavuniya attack: How it happened and why

* Rapid counter-action by Special Forces minimise damage
* Lack of security at key base enables besieged guerrillas to hit back

By Iqbal Athas

Barely two weeks after their foray into Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee, Air Tigers showed up again.

This time they were an integral part of a pre-dawn Tiger guerrilla ground and artillery assault last Tuesday on the sprawling Security Forces Headquarters - Wanni (SFHQ - W) complex located in Vavuniya.
The defining moments of the attack on this garrison, the northernmost under Government control in mainland Sri Lanka, came thrice in regular intervals of six to seven minutes. First, a group of guerrillas infiltrated the area near the Air Force radar unit to spark off a ground battle. Then artillery and mortar shells began to rain. Thereafter, two Czech-built Zlin Z-143 aircraft appeared over the skies to drop bombs.
One of the buildings inside the Security Forces Headquarters – Wanni (SFHQ-W) at Vavuniya damaged by last Tuesday’s Tiger guerrilla ground, artillery and air attack.

If sparks lit up the night sky over Vavuniya, vibrations caused by the bombardment shook the doors and windows of many homes. This was in a vast area surrounding this key town, the northernmost in mainland Sri Lanka under Government control. For decades now, Vavuniya has been the gateway to the Wanni where until recently vast stretches of land were dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Military offensives in the past months have seen security forces regain control of large stretches, mostly west of the A-9 highway and some east of it as periodically reported in The Sunday Times (Situation Report).

Within minutes of news of the attack reaching Colombo, everyone who is someone in the country's defence and security establishment was out of their beds. Whilst officials clasped their phones to receive updates, security forces top brass were busy with their respective operations rooms. Minute-by-minute feedbacks were reaching Colombo as the mayhem continued for some five and half hours.

Last Tuesday, it all began minutes before 3 a.m. Some 14 guerrillas infiltrated the Army sector by traversing through private property. This is at a relatively thin stretch, soon after the main entrance, before the complex expands to a much larger ground area. They wore fatigues resembling the Army. They were walking past buildings occupied by two different battalions of the Army's crack Special Forces. It is here that the gun battles broke out. Alert Special Force personnel began engaging the guerrillas. Three female cadres blasted themselves using the 'suicide kits' they wore. Another committed suicide by biting a cyanide phial. Others edged forward to fire their assault rifles and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) at the Indira II radar installed on a knoll or a small hill.

The radar was damaged and two Indian maintenance technicians - A.K. Thakur and Chinthamani Rant - sustained injuries. They were later driven to Anurahdapura and airlifted to Colombo. Another Indira II to replace the radar that was damaged was hurriedly moved by the Air Force on the same day from their main base at Katunayake. The aim of the guerrillas was to destroy the Vavuniya air defence radar, the one that was usually the first to locate any guerrilla aircraft that is airborne from the Wanni. By moving a replacement Tuesday evening, the Air Force denied the guerrillas any freedom of movement over the air in the Wanni theatre without being detected.
The Indira II (2D) radar at the Air Force sector inside Security Forces Headquarters – Wanni in Vavuniya.

Four Indira II radars (named after late Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi) were gifted to Sri Lanka. This was after it became known that the LTTE had acquired air capability by procuring Zlin Z-143 light aircraft in 2005. Radars are used to detect aircraft, vehicles, ships or other objects through the transmission of electromagnetic waves, which are reflected back by the object. A 2-D radar gives distance and direction whilst 3-D radar would also provide the (height) or altitude in the case of aircraft.

The Air Force area that was under attack lay near the Army's 211 Brigade. Also located in the same vicinity are the second and third battalions of the Special Forces. There is no doubt the guerrillas would have carried out months and months of surveillance piecing together all the information about this target they were to attack. They would have also practised with sand models to prepare their cadres before launching last Tuesday's attack.

This was much the same as the land and air attack on the Air Force base in Anuradhapura on October 22, last year. However, it appears that the guerrillas may have either not known or failed to take into consideration the presence of the Special Forces (SF) troops in the area they infiltrated. The measures the SF adopted to protect their troops and installations evidently took the attackers by complete surprise. Besides those who committed suicide, SF troops shot dead within a short time the majority of the guerrillas who had infiltrated and planned to wreak further havoc.

Within six to seven minutes of the ground attack, heavy artillery and mortars began to fall in the same area. Highly placed security sources said the guerrillas had shifted two 130 mm artillery guns to an area closer to Puliyankulam, located a few kilometres away from the guerrilla checkpoint at Omanthai. Mortars had been fired from locations nearby. These guns had been used earlier from the general area of Pooneryn to periodically direct artillery fire at the Security Forces Headquarters in Jaffna. There were occasions when such attacks forced the Air Force to call off temporarily all military and civilian flights to Palaly.
A guerrilla suicide kit located at the scene of attack by the Army.

Police later learnt that a guerrilla atop a tree and carrying a walkie-talkie gave directions to their artillery gunners to fine tune their targets in the area. Some had artillery shells which missed the mark and fell outside the complex near houses. At least two civilians and a child were injured at Teak Gardens (Thekka Watte). They were treated at the Vanuniya hospital. One such barrage had killed six cows and bulls. The same sources said the Army directed counter artillery fire destroying one guerrilla artillery gun. However, independent verification of this claim is not possible.

The guerrillas had fired some 70 to 80 heavy artillery rounds during the pre-dawn attack. Later, on Tuesday afternoon two more rounds fell on the military complex. This was when troops were on a clearing operation within the area as well as ahead of their defended localities.

Another six to seven minutes later, two Air Tiger Zlin Z-143 aircraft were over the military complex. First reports said they dropped eight bombs - four near the Air Force installations on the relatively narrow stretch of land just after the main entrance. The other four had been dropped on the large area that encompasses many buildings including administrative blocks of the SFHQ-W. Three had not exploded. Investigations thereafter have raised doubts on the number that exploded, whether it was only three or less and whether only five or six bombs were dropped.

This is after a close examination of the sites that have been badly damaged. Investigations are continuing. The ground, artillery and air attack had begun just before 3 a.m. Tuesday. Within an hour it had ended. However, the search operations for more possible guerrilla infiltrators continued until 7.30 a.m. It is only thereafter that the damage caused and the casualty counts became clear.

Roofs of buildings near the Air Force installations were badly damaged. In the Police sector at SFHQ-W, there was a sigh of relief. The roof of the main armoury of the division was badly damaged but a concrete slab below had protected the weaponry from being destroyed. Six vehicles including a bowser, truck, van and a tractor were damaged.
Grenades found by the Army after the attack.

Initial reports to the media by Army officials said bodies of ten Tiger cadres, including five females, were found within the military complex. As this news spread worldwide, the LTTE repeated the same figure in a news release. Their idea was to hide the exact number of cadres who were assigned to carry out the attack. Later on Tuesday, another male guerrilla body was found bringing the LTTE death toll to 11. Preliminary investigations by the Police have revealed that 14 guerrillas entered the military complex and three later got away. They left behind assault rifles, RPGs, grenades, communication sets, a machine gun, a global positioning system, ammunition, chocolates among other items.

The 14 guerrillas who took part in the attack Police believe is in addition the one who was atop a tree serving as a forward observer to direct artillery fire. This is not the first time the LTTE had juggled with numbers and doctored photographs to give the impression that all their cadres assigned for attacks had been killed.

They did so during the attack on the Air Force base in Anuradhapura. Last Tuesday's attack is no exception. See box story on page 5. Thirteen soldiers, a civilian attached to the Army and a policeman were killed at the scene. Another police officer died at the Vavuniya hospital bringing the death toll to 16. Those wounded were: Army 24, Air Force 7 and Police 9.

The Sri Lanka Air Force claimed later on Tuesday that one of its Chinese built F-7 interceptor jets had destroyed one of the Air Tiger aircraft. Two officers of the Air Force, a security source said, were on hand at last Wednesday's National Security Council meeting to provide a brief on how the attack occurred.
Part of the damage caused to the Police section at the SFHQ-W

Though the Air Force has no pictorial evidence either of the attack or the debris of the destroyed aircraft on the ground, an Air Force source told The Sunday Times "the pilot activated the firing mechanism only after his on board radar locked on the target. That was how the air-to-air missile was discharged. Thereafter, when he was taking a turn, he saw a huge ball of fire some 600 metres away." The source claimed the missile would not have been released automatically if the lock-in mechanism did not home in on the target. However, the LTTE said its aircraft had "returned safely." Independent verification of both claims is not possible.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, the LTTE said:

"A Black Tiger unit of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched a pre-dawn attack on the radar station situated in the Wanni Operational Headquarters of the Sri Lankan armed forces at 035 hrs, 9th September, 2008. The radar station was destroyed in the attack. The Air Tigers and a battery of Col. Kiddu Artillery Regiment assisted the Black Tigers team in this attack. At least 20 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and several wounded in the attack.

"The aircraft of the Air Tigers that participated in the sortie safely returned home. "Weaponry stores, communication tower, communication facility and anti aircraft guns were also destroyed in this attack. Regional commanding stations of the Wanni Command and the Special Forces of the Sri Lankan Army were badly damaged in this attack. Ten Black Tigers have sacrificed their precious lives for the liberation of our Motherland in this attack."

The salutary feature of last Tuesday's attack is the role played by troops of the Army's Special Forces. They did minimise the damage that would have been caused to the Air Force radar station. However, the incident has once again highlighted the woefully inadequate measures to ensure perimeter security in military installations.

Like during the attack on the Air Force base at Anuradhapura, the guerrillas succeeded in infiltrating a major headquarters complex. With that, directing artillery fire and using aircraft primitive compared to the assets of the Air Force, they succeeded in creating an impact as they came under heavy pressure on the battlefronts in the Wanni.

Figures, photos doctored?

An attempt once again by the LTTE to make it appear that only ten of their cadres, five males and five females, took part in last Tuesday's ground assault on the Security Forces Headquarters in Wanni (SFHQ-W) proved futile.
The LTTE picture posted on the Tamilnet shows LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran with the ten cadres who were purportedly involved in the attack. Police said at least 14 cadres took part.

The figure of ten guerrilla deaths was the first official account given by the military. It said five male and five female bodies were found within the Wanni military complex.

By Tuesday afternoon, the Tamilnet website released a photograph of the ten cadres posing with their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran before they died during the attack. The picture, The Sunday Times learnt, has been doctored to show only ten. Later on Tuesday, one more dead body of a guerrilla cadre was found within the military complex. This is besides at least four others who escaped.

A senior Army official at Vavuniya said that 14 bodies of guerrilla cadres were handed over to the LTTE through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) last Thursday. He said 11 bodies belonged to guerrillas who were killed when they attacked the SFHQ (Wanni). Three others were killed in encounters with the Army in the Weli Oya sector.

However, Aleksandra Matjevic, ICRC spokesperson told The Sunday Times she could not say how many bodies belonged to LTTE members who were involved in the attack in Vavuniya. She said she could only confirm 14 bodies were handed over on Thursday.
LTTE leader Prabhakaran “honouring” the Black Tiger cadres during ceremonies before their funeral. - tamilnet.

On Friday, Tamilnet posted a picture of LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran "honouring" the "ten dead Black Tiger cadres." It showed only a few coffins.

Soon after the attack on the Air Force base in Anuradhapura in October, last year, the LTTE said in a press release that 21 of its "Black Tigers" had died. However, CID investigations revealed that 27 had taken part in the attack. On that occasion too, the Tamilnet website posted a picture of Mr. Prabhakaran posing with only 21 Black Tigers.

But, months later Tamil websites posted reports and photographs of Mr. Prabhakaran “honouring” cadres who had taken part in the attack on the Anuradhapura air base. This included those who had survived.

From Sunday Leader:
Lapses

In fact, after the Tiger attack on the Wanni Security Forces Headquarters in Vavuniya there was much finger pointing between India and Sri Lanka over whose lapses led to the disaster, the details of which cannot be disclosed due to national security considerations and the prevalent emergency regulations.

Adding to the President's troubles on the diplomatic front was the Peace Secretariat Chief and Secretary, Human Rights Ministry, Rajiva Wijesinha, whose critical comments on UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had Rajapakse aghast.

The timing of Wijesinha's comments on the UN Secretary General could not have come at a worse time for the President, considering him having to meet with Ban Ki-Moon within the next fortnight at the UN General Assembly sessions, and immediate damage-control measures were set in motion.

The reason for Wijesinha's ire was Ban Ki-Moon's expression of deep concern over the escalating violence in northern Sri Lanka and the impact it was having on civilians.

This statement saw Wijesinha in characteristic style going for the Secretary General's jugular stating inter alia; "Since there have been hardly any civilian casualties during the recent offensives in Sri Lanka, it is possible that the Secretary General was prompted by reports of large numbers of civilian casualties on other theatres of war, which misled him into believing that all forces fighting terrorism are alike. It is to be hoped however that, even while he might want to send a message to other countries he will study the Sri Lanka situation carefully in the future.

"Perhaps with knowledge there will come wisdom, and he will publicly acknowledge the extra ordinarily good record of the Sri Lankan forces in this regard, their careful selection of military targets, the paucity of even collateral damage."

Pundits

Embarrassed at this outburst, President Rajapakse immediately directed Sri Lanka's Ambassador to the UN, H.M.S. Palihakkara through the Foreign Ministry to disassociate the government from Wijesinha's comments.

The President wanted it communicated to the UN Secretary General, Wijesinha's comments did not reflect his views or that of his government and was sorry at the development. Rajapakse also ordered Wijesinha's comments to be withdrawn from all government websites and for him to be told to guard his tongue and refrain from making any statements.

Thus as the war reaches a decisive stage the President has to fight not only the Tigers, but also an emerging alliance and his own pundits who are busy scoring own goals.

And this is the way of Paradise.