Northern Front: Retreating Tigers and Advancing Army
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
"If he (enemy) is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them."
"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."
-Sun Tzu in “The Art of War”.
In what appears to be a co-incidence the military fortunes of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been declining on the Northern battlefront ever since our Lady of the Rosary was relocated from her traditional abode at Maruthamadhu (Madhu).
[Madhu Church, file pic by Mahesh]
The sacred statue was taken amid controversial circumstances to St. Xaviers church at Thevayanpitty in April this year. A few days later on April 15th the armed forces took control of Madhu and its environs.
Thereafter the armed forces were on the ascendant in the theatre of war in the north. The prolonged military stalemate was broken as the army began advancing and the tigers started retreating.
With the army moving in on Vellaankulam the northernmost town in Mannar district along the coastal Mannar – Pooneryn road or A – 32 highway adjacent Thevaayanpitty became vulnerable.
This in turn resulted in the sacred statue being brought in July to the Bishops house in Mannar town.
Our Lady of Madhu was expected to return to her rightful residence by August.
Meanwhile there is euphoria in the Colombo corridors of power about an overwhelming victory over the LTTE being imminent.
The recent series of military successes has reinforced the feeling that the writing is on the wall for the tigers.
The Rajapakse regime shifted focus towards launching ground – based offensives against the LTTE in the north after the tigers were evicted from the East in 2007.
After months of protracted warfare in which military gains and losses see- sawed it appeared that a military stale mate was setting in.
Recent military developments have broken that stalemate and reversed the situation. It appears that the armed forces like the tortoise in the fable are proceeding slowly and steadily towards their goals.
The armed forces at one stage had two short – term and two long term goals in the North Western battle arena.
In the short term the goals were Adampan and Madhu. The long term objective was Vidathaltheevu along the Mannar littoral and full control of the A – 32 or Mannar – Pooneryn road.
The initial breakthrough was in March – April this year when the armed forces moved in three directions taking Uyilankulam, Sinna and Periyapandivirichaan and strategic areas of the Kattukkaraikulam or Giants tank basin.
This created a situation where the task of retaining Madhu was made a formidable one for the LTTE.
Attempting to retain Madhu also meant an escalation of military activity that could cause great damage to the revered Catholic Church and its environs.
Against that backdrop the LTTE withdrew from Madhu after ensuring that the Our Lady of Refuge statue was removed to Thevaayanpitty.
Though the decision to do so was made by Mannar Catholic Bishop Most Rev. Rayappu Joseph and it was members of the clergy who carried out the mission LTTE “facilitation” was involved in the re-location.
It was after the departure of Our Lady of Madhu that the armed forces took over Madhu.
From that point onwards there was remarkable improvement in the progress of the military on the battlefront.
While the superstitious and spiritually inclined may be tempted to see divine intervention as the cause there is also a more practical explanation for this favourable fluctuation.
The location of Madhu with its proximity to two key junctions provided the armed forces with geo – strategic advantage. The armed forces began exploiting this advantage.
Besides the fall of Madhu provided a morale booster that was reflected widely along the frontlines.
The first major advance was when the armed forces took over the Giants tank or Yodha Ela basin and environs by April end.
The second week of May saw Adampan fall.
Thereafter key areas like Palampity, Periyamadhu, Nedunkandal etc began falling at regular intervals. Ultimately around 120 sq miles of territory consisting of prime agricultural land known as the “rice bowl of Mannar “ was taken over in its entirety.
The last tiger bastion in this respect was the 300 metre long 30 x40 bunker with a 7 ft high earth bund at Nedunkandal.
Now the scene was set for the march on Vidathaltheevu. The Vidathaltheevu promontory was about two km away from the Pallamadhu junction on A – 32.
Vidathal is a thorny scrub (mimosa cinerea) found in many areas of the North – East. Vidathaltheevu means Island of Vidathal though it is only a promontory.
It has a natural harbour but marine access from the gulf of Mannar was made possible only through the construction of the Arnolda canal in the forties of the last century.
In recent times Vidathaltheevu had become the major sea tiger base along the north – western coast.
The tigers had set up an 8 km long defence line stretching from the banks of Naayaaru via Naayaatruveli to Piraamanaalankulam.
This LTTE line was a difficult obstacle to surmount and it appeared that the armed forces could be bogged down for quite a while.
While the 7,000 strong 58 division engaged the LTTE along multiple fronts in Mannar the newly raised 61 or Task Force – 2 comprising 3,000 elite troops was also shifted from Manal Aaru/Weli Oya to Mannar.
This induction along with a change of strategy began paying dividends. Troops moved clandestinely through jungle areas in a northward direction from points along Palampitty and Periyamadhu along the Iranai iluppaikulam – Pallamadhu road.
They succeeded in reaching Sirattykulam on the border of Thunukkai AGA division. Though located in the North – western sector Thunukkai forms part of the Mullaitheevu district.
After reaching Sirattykulam the troops changed direction and moved westwards from the east. They reached a comparatively unknown yet key location called Kooraai.
Kooraai was an irrigation settlement begun in the eighties of the 20th century. The work was not completed and the anecut construction of Koorai tank was abandoned.
Only some irrigation dept buildings and around 40 – 50 families remain to tell the tale of what could have been a flourishing settlement.
Once the armed forces reached Koorai they used it as a launching pad to mount two forward movements further to the west towards the A – 32 or Mannar – Pooneryn road.
One column moved through Aathimottai and interdicted the A – 32 at Kalliaddy. The other column moved along Koyilkulam and Puthukulam and breached the A – 32 at Pallivaasalpitty. A third column broke out from Periyamadhu and reached Pallamadhu junction.
This tripartite thrust saw the LTTE being checkmated. The tigers were now boxed in at Vidathaltheevu notwithstanding their elaborate defences further to the South of Vidathal. The army was actually about 2 – 3 km ahead of Vidathaltheevu on the A – 32.
The tigers had no choice other than to withdraw from Vidathaltheevu by sea. This they did and when the armed forces moved in neither tigers nor their boats were there.
The next big town along the A – 32 was Iluppaikadavai where the LTTE had a large base housing elements of the Charles Anthony regiment. The tigers began withdrawing from Iluppaikadavai simultaneously.
Thus the armed forces continued their victorious thrust further north along the A – 32 and took Iluppaikadavai also. By the last week of July the armed forces had reached a point close to Moondrampitty along the Mannar – Pooneryn road.
The last big town on the A – 32 that falls under Mannar district is Vellankulam. Thereafter it is Kilinochchi district where the first big town is Mulangaavil.
The river Paali Aaru reaches the sea near Vellankulam. It appears that the LTTE is getting ready for the long haul at Paali aaru – Vellankulam. Bunkers and trenches are being constructed and fortified.
Meanwhile there is an impression in the South that all sea movement along the North – Western coast has been stopped for the LTTE after the fall of Vidathaltheevu. This is incorrect.
While the loss of Vidathaltheevu would be keenly felt by the tigers sea movement along the North – western coast has certainly not been circumscribed.
There are coastal points like Naachikudaah, Pallikudaah, Valapaadu and Peimunai along the Kilinochchi district coast that can be utilised by the LTTE.
Increased sea tiger movement in the seas between Thalaimannar and Neduntheevu (Delft) in recent times indicate that LTTE marine movement is undergoing a sea change.
Since the LTTE needs north – western sea access to maintain contact with the Indian coast the tigers would most probably resist army advances further along the A – 32 fiercely.
While the bulk of LTTE sea supply is on the east coast between Challai and Alampil , India remains a chief source of supply of fuel, medicine, dry rations and metal for the LTTE.
Thus it is of paramount importance that the LTTE preserves and protects at least part of the 77 km long Mannar – Pooneryn road. Currently about half the A – 32 highway is under Government control.
Against this backdrop the tigers will try and make a last ditch stand at Vellankulam – Paali Aaru to prevent further advances of the army along the North –Western coast into Kilinochchi district.
There is also another reason for the LTTE to fight it out ferociously at Vellankulam.
This is because of a road from Vellankulam to Maankulam along the Kandy – Jaffna road or A – 9 highway.
Situated along this road are the important and relatively thickly populated towns of Thunukkaai and Mallaavi. Holding off the army at Vellankulam could deter the armed forces from gaining control of one end of this minor yet geo- strategically vital road.
Even if the LTTE is able to contain the army at Vellankulam the threat to Mallavi and Thunukkai is by no means diminished.
This is because the armed forces have made significant strides on related fronts.
Forces stationed to the north of Nattaankandal have proceeded towards Thunukkaai through a place called Ottankulam.
The last week of July saw the army being engaged in combat with the LTTE at Kalvilaan about 3km away from Thunukkaai.
Likewise forces stationed near Panankaamam havein a surprise move proceeded through Paandiyankulam and reached the South of Vavunikulam.
Panankaamam which is about 7 km away from Vavunikulam was the fiefdom ruled by the Wanni chieftain Pandara Vannian or Wanni Bandara who defied the British at the historic battle of Katsilaimadhu.
The latter part of July saw the armed forces and tigers embroiled in intense conflict around the Vavunikulam tank.
If the armed forces are able to move via the tank bund area to Paalaipaani or Kidaaipidithakulam then it would be possible to interdict the LTTE supply route along Vannivilaankulam - Moondrumurippu.
This in turn would affect tiger logistics drastically on the one hand while enhancing modes of supply for the army among various points in that sector.
In addition the fall of Vavunikulam would also result in the armed forces being only about 4 – 5 km away from Mallavi. Thus it would be possible to reach Mankulam via Mallavi if Vavunikulam falls.
Apart from the fighting in this sector there is also fighting in the Paalamottai – Navvi areas of Vavuniya district and also in the Manal Aaru/Weli – Oya region.
In Weli – Oya the armed forces have moved forward about 8 – 10 km to the north on four points namely, Paalaamai Odai/Kiri Ibban wewa, Aandaankulam, Janakapura and Kokkuthoduwaai.
This has brought the armed forces about 4 miles to the south of Kumulamunai. Given the streak of successes enjoyed by the army in recent times there is the distinct possibility of advancing along the coast right up to Mullaitheevu town and harbour.
The armed forces have also caused the LTTE to vacate its chief forward base called Munnagam. Two other abandoned tiger bases – Michael and Suganthan - have also been discovered.
According to some estimates the armed forces have captured about 900 sq km area of LTTE controlled territory in the districts of Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitheevu.
This has resulted in a propaganda change.
Earlier when a military stalemate prevailed it was emphasised that the armed forces were not trying to acquire real estate and that the main goal was to kill as many tigers as possible.
In support of this assertion detailed accounts of LTTE casualties were regularly released though these were at variance with tiger figures.
Once the armed forces began advancing deep into tiger territory the focus changed. Nowadays much is being made of the tiger territory being “liberated” by the armed forces.
Naturally the government is making much political capital out of the successful campaign conducted by the armed forces.
There is an orchestrated propaganda effort that has brought about great expectations in the public mood.
There is euphoria that the tigers are on the run and that the LTTE is collapsing like a pack of cards.
The liberation of Kilinochchi and Mullaitheevu and parts of the Vavuniya, Mannar and Jaffna districts under LTTE do not seem a remote possibility in the popular psyche any more.
The seeming inability of the tigers in stopping the military juggernaut adds credence to the belief that the beginning of the LTTE’s end is underway.
However dominant public perception fails to take note of a crucial factor that has often been asserted by this writer in these columns.
“The tigers may be down but they are certainly not out”.
While the armed forces are certainly on the ascendant and could ultimately come out on top through superior manpower, firepower, armoured power, airpower and sea power, the LTTE cannot be written off as a spent force prematurely.
As mentioned in these columns earlier the LTTE set up three broad defence rings in the northern territory it controlled.
The first was around all area dominated by the tigers.
The second was around all areas to the east of the A – 9 highway.
The third was around a swathe of strategically important areas in Mullaitheevu including a coastal strip.
Most of the fighting so far has been in and around the first ring of defence.
Apart from hostilities in the Manal aaru/ Weli – Oya region there has been no fighting in the comparatively important regions to the east of the A – 9.
The armed forces have certainly progressed in the fighting in regions to the west of the A – 9. Yet the fighting is neither conclusive or decisive.
Also despite several attempts the army has been unable to break LTTE lines set up to the south of Muhamaalai in the Jaffna peninsula.
Besides the fighting has been protracted and bitter. Although the LTTE has come off second best in these clashes there are three salient ponts to be noted.
Firstly the tigers have not lost much of their military assets in spite of the reversals and withdrawals. Retreating tigers have transported most of their vehicles, boats, artillery and armaments to safer locations.
Secondly the tigers have deployed only about a 40 % of their cadres in the fighting so far. The bulk of these have been new recruits and raw conscripts. The ratio of senior to junior cadres in the fighting has been roughly 25% to 75%
Thirdly the cream of the LTTE like its special forces, the leopard commando unit, the elite brigades of the Charles Anthony regiment etc have not been utilised extensively.
Thus it could be surmised that despite the losses suffered the LTTE continues to retain the bulk of its military assets , experienced cadre and elite fighting formations.
In that context the LTTE remains a potent and powerful force still.
What is of crucial importance is the fact that the LTTE has been fighting a defensive war so far.
It is a moot point as to when and if the LTTE would change track and go on the offensive.
It may be that the armed forces by applying constant military pressure are constricting the LTTE’s ability to launch a counter strike or counter offensive.
It may also be that the tiger leader Velupillai Prabakharan is working to his own agenda and is biding his time before striking out.
The acid test will be when the LTTE does strike out.
It is only then that the question of whether the LTTE is a spent force or not would be decided effectively.
The tiger will not eat grass even if it is hungry.
The tiger crouches only to pounce.
These are proverbs in Tamil about the four – legged feline.
This proverbial wisdom applies in a politico – military sense to the two – legged tigers also.
Meanwhile the time for a tiger pounce draws near.
All things being constant it is only a matter of time before the armed forces would reach Pooneryn or the A – 9 road.
If that happens the war would be carried right into the tiger heartland . It would also mean restriction of supplies and greater vulnerability for the tiger hierarchy.
Cruel military logic suggests that the LTTE would launch pre- emptive strikes before that.
Instead of waiting for war to come to him Prabakharan is very likely to take the fight to the enemy.
It could be a counter offensive like “Oyatha Alaigal” or ceaseless waves in 1999 -2000.
It could also mean extending the war through dubious means to the South.
What happens if these things do happen?
Would the armed forces be able to counter these challenges and defeat the LTTE?
Would the tigers be able to inflict extensive damage and reverse the situation?
Only time will tell!
DBS Jeyaraj can be reached at: djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com
This article was written on July 28th 2008 and appeared in August 15, 2008 issue of Montage Sri Lanka Magazine.
end:
The time for a tiger pounce draws near.
Experience dictates that the Tamil Freedom figters aka LTTE, will respond to the ferocious military advances with the help of Russian and Israeli jet bombers, helicopter gun ships, tanks, and multi barrel grenade/rocket launches with equal ferocity, in 8-12 weeks. The author is correct to speculate the fight would be taken to the South and West, with whatever means that are readily available to them.
LTTE now believe that "What is sauce for the goose, is also sauce for the
gander. That would be tragic to the Sinhalese living there who are already feeling the pains of the 3 year war.
With the northeast monsoons ready to set in 8 weeks, the air power would be diminished, and the tanks movements rather restricted. The terrain becomes unfriendly with muddy landscape, and torrential rains flooding the unpaved roads and side roads, which also could be mined. It could become a nightmare for the young soldiers who are fighting for a wage, willing to die for the politicians cause. i.e To prevent a separate or Federal state, and establish a unitary state.
Even the GOM - Gulf of Mannar waters will become very unfriendly causing the SL Navy unusual difficulties. The LTTE has over 2 decades of experience in this terrain and conditions.
Anybody who writes off the LTTE, is nothing but a Tom Fool, and has not learnt anything from history or the 30 year experience in war with the Tamils.
Would the tigers be able to inflict extensive damage and reverse the situation?
Only time will tell!
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