THE BOMBING OF TRINCOMALEE BY THE FLYING TIGERS:

Situation report
The grave story of the "ghost" aircraft
* LTTE air wing's first strike for 2008 causes deaths, damage and poses questions
* Main target missed but danger of flying bomb increases

Last Tuesday (August 26) was a cloudy night in eastern Sri Lanka. At a jetty in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Sri Lanka Navy's eastern headquarters, there was hectic activity.

Troops were preparing to board the "Jetliner," the transport vessel acquired from an Indonesian company. It is capable of carrying some 3,000 passengers besides cargo. At dawn next day this vessel was to begin its voyage to Kankesanthurai (KKS)
Two of three bombs dropped by Tiger guerrilla aircraft last Tuesday night fell on the multi-storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa at the Navy’s Eastern Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Here is a section of the roof damaged by the bombing. One bomb that fell on the roof of a building nearby did not explode.


If maritime movements with logistics from Trincomalee to KKS serve as the umbilical cord for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, the "Jetliner" plays a pivotal role. It is the main mode of transport for troops and police officers. They either take the seaward journey for deployment or when returning home on leave.

Amidst all activity that night, the Operations Room at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters received reports of what was suspected to be advancing Tiger guerrilla aircraft. It was just one minute to 9 p.m. This was after naval craft at sea observed echoes on their radar screens. Telephones of the various units at Dockyard went busy. Soon air defence gun positions directed fire into the night sky. So did navy patrol craft at sea. Even some troops deployed in the Trincomalee town area directed rifle fire into the night sky. Yet, none was able to observe the intruding aircraft. It was dark and raining.

Just then, loud explosions rendered the air. Bombs were falling. The first fell on the Civil Engineering Yard causing extensive damage to buildings. It is located opposite the CNAD or the Ceylon National Armoured Depot. The CNAD has been in existence from the time of the British who had their base at the Dockyard during World War II. Three others fell on the multi storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa. Two bombs exploded and one that fell on a roof did not. Four sailors were killed on the spot. Thirty-five more were wounded, a large number sustaining minor injuries. Seven of those seriously injured were later airlifted to Colombo. In all, four bombs were dropped. Three had exploded and one remained intact.
Tamilnet picture shows LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran posing with “pilots” and staff of his “Air Wing” reportedly after last Tuesday’s air raid on Sri Lanka Navy’s Eastern Headquarters in Trincomalee.

Earlier that day, there had also been another unexpected tragedy. A sailor in a dinghy who went around placing depth charges in the seas around the Navy’s eastern headquarters area died when one of them exploded prematurely. These depth charges are timed to explode under water to prevent infiltration by guerrilla divers. The explosions trigger strong under water waves capable of causing devastating effects on intruders including the bursting of ear drums.

Independent of this development, the Navy had also alerted the Air Defence Control and Command Centre (ADC & C) located at the Air Force base in Katunayake. The guerrilla aircraft, they determined, had flown low from somewhere in Mullaitivu towards Trincomalee. (See map for suspected flight path). Reports said that the guerrilla aircraft was some 57 kilometres away from Trincomalee then. The SLAF base in Katunayake went into action following Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).

It was some 19 minutes later when two Chinese built F-7 interceptor jets equipped with air-to-air missiles scoured into the skies. They gave chase to the guerrilla aircraft. It was a case of the enemy aircraft being located too close. However, they had yet got away away. On the ground, Air Force personnel were tracking the movement of the returning guerrilla aircraft using 2-D radars. With this radar, they were unable to discern the altitude of the guerrilla aircraft. Due to this and other factors that cannot be spelt out for obvious reasons, the guerrilla aircraft got away. This is despite a number of counter measures adopted after reports of Tiger guerrillas acquiring air capability. Though such a capability was regarded as very primitive, tougher and most sophisticated measures were put in place to counter them. This included air defence systems, surveillance radars and rapid reaction mechanisms.

Measures to deal with the shortcomings that have arisen have become the subject of close study at the highest levels of the SLAF. The matter was examined at discussions yesterday too. It has become clear to the authorities that the target of the guerrilla aircraft was the "Jetliner" which was in the Nicholson Cove. However, security authorities believe the guerrilla aircraft veered away to bomb the other locations after drawing fire from the ground. If the bombs did fall on this large passenger cum cargo transport vessel, there was a likelihood of greater damage being caused. If they succeeded, the guerrillas believed they would be able to disrupt the movement of troops from the north to the south and vice versa. Attacks on the Jetliner when it is at sea are difficult since the vessel is heavily guarded by naval craft as well as helicopter gunships during its voyage.

In the absence of visual contact, the security authorities are unable to say conclusively the number of aircraft used by the Tiger guerrillas. However, both the SLAF and the Navy have reason to believe there were two Czech-built Zlin - Z 143 light aircraft that were used. They say the bombs used were locally made and weighed 25 kilogrammes.

Lending further credence to reports that the guerrillas used two aircraft, as in all previous occasions, were photographs in the Tamilnet web site. They showed the guerrilla "pilots" wearing "wings" together with others who are suspected to be ground crew posing with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. See photograph on this page This is what Tamilnet had to say on the incident:

"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9.15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed. The aircraft safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said."

This is the sixth air attack carried out by Tiger guerrillas. It is the first such attack in 2008. All previous attacks were carried out last year. The first came on March 26, 2007 when they bombed the Air Force base at Katunayake. It left three airmen dead and 16 wounded. The second was on the Army Engineers Unit in the High Security Zone at the Security Forces Headquarters in Palaly on April 23, 2007. Six soldiers were killed and 13 wounded. A third abortive attempt was made to bomb the Air Force base at Katunayake on April 26, 2007. The fourth came when two guerrilla aircraft bombed the Shell Liquefied Petroleum Gas facility at Muthurajawela and the adjoining Ceylon Petroleum Corporation's storage facility. The fifth came when the guerrillas attacked the SLAF base in Anuradhapura on October 22 last year.
A sailor wounded in last Tuesday’s Tiger guerrilla air attack at the Trincomalee base Hospital.
Photo: Amadoru Amerasinghe

Despite the six different air raids, guerrilla aircraft are yet to be destroyed or damaged. This is the first time in 16 months (and for the first time this year), that the guerrillas carried out the air attack on the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Even if their air capability, which is no match for the conventional capability of the Air Force, remains intact, there are reasons for their debut this year.
The guerrillas have come under heavy military pressure particularly on the western part of the Wanni sector. Since seizing control of areas in and around the Madhu Church in April this year, troops have continued their thrust. They re-captured the Sea Tiger base in Vidattaltivu and continued their advance to seize more territory. Troops have re-captured a vast swathe of territory inwards from the coast just south of Nachchikuda where a major Sea Tiger base is located.

There were reports last week that the guerrillas were shifting logistics from this base, the last remaining facility used for smuggling military and medical supplies across the Gulf of Mannar from Tamil Nadu. As the troops are poised to move eastwards to seize more terrain, in the guerrilla-dominated districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, bitter battles loom large. The guerrillas have been making hurried preparations constructing defences and positioning cadres. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate any further.

In carrying out their sixth air attack, the guerrillas have again demonstrated their ability, with primitive air capability, to infiltrate highly-defended areas to take on military targets. That has enabled them to create some impact.

In the wake of these developments, a warning contained in an Air Force report after it was known that the guerrillas had acquired air capability (Situation Report - February 27 2005) is relevant. It warned, among other matters, that it could "be a precursor to using the air assets for offensive air operations against Government assets. This is either through the use of aircraft to drop bombs or fire at targets. They could also use an aircraft as a 'flying bomb.'

Despite all the sophisticated equipment and mechanisms in place, the guerrilla aircraft have continued to get away after air raids. Until a fool proof system is in place, there is little doubt that the threat of a "flying bomb" remains.
I CAN’T GO HOME

It must be noted that this dinner is being held in the High Security Zone in the centre of the country’s capital and such a venue in the current circumstances is not the right place. This poses possibilities of some ugly or even tragic incidents and one should wonder why the organizers have chosen such a risky place for the occasion. Or was this a choice of Father Jeyanesan and his friends such as Newton Gnanachandran, Chandran Ariaratnam, Shanthakumar, Selvarajah and others?

"Trapped into the WTM-LTTE den, the Canadian Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora is a community that is being exploited by clever crooks and downright desperados in the name of liberation for their people in Sri Lanka.


LTTE’s Air Raid on Trincomalee and Sri Lanka's Offensive Operations

I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards.”

(August 29, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The night raid by two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air wing on the Trincomalee naval base on August 26, 2008 may be termed as moderately successful. The two aircraft were similar to the ZLIN piston-engined ones that had raided Katunayake air base on March 27, 2007 and in the subsequent attacks on Palali air base on April 24, 2007 and the Anuradhapura air field on October 22, 2007. As in all the four air raids earlier they evaded both the ground fire and the chase by Sri Lanka air force fighters to return safely to their home base.

There had been discrepancies in the reports on the raid both in the number of casualties and on how the LTTE raid was conducted out. Broadly the raid went somewhat like this. Around 9 PM the LTTE aircraft flew in undetected and managed to sneak into the air space of the high security zone of the naval complex housing the Eastern Naval Headquarters and the Trincomalee dockyard. After dodging the anti aircraft gunfire when they were detected, one aircraft managed to drop two improvised bombs. Though the Eastern Naval Headquarters was not struck, at least four sailors were killed when one of the bombs struck a sailors’ billet. Ten to 20 persons (depending upon the source of the report) were reported injured.

It seems the intruding aircraft were detected a little late to engage them by fighters. Evading the anti aircraft fire the LTTE aircraft flew off after the strike on the sailors’ barracks. As in the earlier cases, one bomb did not explode. In retaliation the air force fighters took off to hunt the raiders but could not succeed in doing so. After that the air force bombed Iranamadu air strip and its assets.

Though the defence spokesman called it an abortive raid, it was not wholly so. The LTTE raiders succeeded at least partially in fulfilling their mission. And they managed to inflict casualty on the security forces while escaping unscathed. Two inquiries are being held apparently to find out how the LTTE planes managed to infiltrate through the air defence network without detection and carried out the raid.

Though the raid did not create the panic reaction among the public seen last year after the Katunayake raid, it will surely give a psychological lift up to the sagging morale of the LTTE’s support network both at home and abroad. So far they had to console themselves only with the rhetoric of the political commissar Nadesan on the impending LTTE response to the successful Sri Lankan offensive going on now for two years. The raid will also come as a shot in the arm for LTTE’s defenders in frontlines who had been having a tough time for the last few months as the offensive gathered momentum. A far as the Sri Lanka public is concerned they appear to be taking it in the stride as one of the necessary evils of pursuing the military option. Thus the LTTE air raids appear to have lost their public threat potential enhanced by the very audacity of their ability to carry out such a raid well away from the LTTE home grounds in Wanni.

Otherwise, the air raid would be classified as a small scale raid daringly carried out. But in comparison with the scale of the happenings in the battlefronts of the north, the air raid does not have the potential to cause significant impact on the ongoing operations. Except for tasking a special commando force to seek and destroy the LTTE’s secret hangars in Wanni as the operation progresses, no other special action would probably be taken at the battlefront. The LTTE operational planners probably know this limitation. The pressure on them must be mounting as the security forces advance had been causing exodus of civilians in thousands from battle zones. So they probably carried out the air raid for want of any other manageable operational task that could create some impact immediately.

At the same time, operationally the raid gives some interesting insights –

• The ability of the LTTE air wing to penetrate the airspace in high security zones remains undiminished, despite the counter measures taken so far. As discussed in my earlier articles on the subject, light aircraft with small radar signatures, flying below the horizon can escape early radar detection. This is more so if they follow a flight path hugging the coastline contours to escape early detection.

• To overcome this weakness the anti aircraft defence network should include integrated ground observer posts along likely air ingress routes. This is a very time tested civil defence method against air raids in vogue for over seventy years! However, to be successful it needs committed people with well rehearsed procedure for identification and reporting.

• On detection, the anti aircraft guns need to put maximum number of shots in the air in the fastest time to get a hit. In a night raid visual firing is fraught with serious limitations as the city lights in the horizon confuse the vision. This will again require a lot of practice firing.

• In the past also the fighters had never been able to chase and kill the raiding aircraft. This is not surprising. Rarely will the fighters be able to respond in time unless they are positioned in operational readiness platforms (ORP) on the runway at the airfield. The mute point is, do such occasional raids by light aircraft merit tedious ORP status involving expensive hi-tech fighters designed for not only air combat but also ground support operations in counter insurgency? Only the security chiefs can answer this question.

• It is surprising that despite the large number of modern surveillance and early warning devices available to monitor the intruding aircraft from take off to reaching target area, the LTTE pilots had always managed to prevent detection till the last moment when they gain height. Perhaps the security forces would do well to study the successful tactics of these “amateur fighter pilots” a little more seriously to eliminate the air threat.

• There has been high rate of failure of the improvised bombs of the LTTE. This would show the LTTE has not been able to refine both the aerodynamics of the bomb design and the use of appropriate fuses to reduce the strike failure rate.

I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards. Looking at the well planned operations so far, the security forces would have already catered for such a possibility in their contingency plans.

Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
[TamilNet, Wednesday, 27 August 2008, 19:52 GMT]
Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9:15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed.

The aircrafts safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said.

The Tigers issued photos of the Air Tiger fighters with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan.

LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]
LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]


Chronology:
27.08.08 Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
26.08.08 LTTE air strike on Trincomalee harbour - SLN


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