Machan screened in Venice
By Vincent Dowd
BBC News, Venice
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2008/08/080831_machan_venice.shtml
A scene from Machan (photo: Lankadissent.com)
Machan explores the desperation of young Sri Lankans looking for better life
A film which was premier this weekend at the Venice Film Festival is one of the few international co-productions ever made in Sri Lanka.
Machan is based on the true story of a group of Sri Lankans who travelled to Germany on the pretext of taking part in a sports tournament but who were in fact seeking to emigrate.
Four years ago the film producer Uberto Pasolini spotted a news item which led him to make Machan in and around Colombo.
Sri Lanka handball team vanishes
23 Sri Lankans had formed a team to play handball - a sport they had no experience of - and secured invitations to play in Germany.
Once there they disappeared into the grey economy, as had been their plan.
We used the people that we met in our research and created the 23 lives and the 23 characters with their dreams and their problems and aspirations into our film
Director Uberto Pasolini
Some years back Mr Pasolini - Italian-born but long in the UK film industry -produced the hit movie The Full Monty, here, he thought, might be another story of friendship and struggle against circumstance to engross audiences.
Rather than track down the original emigrants, he researched the story by talking to people still in Sri Lanka.
"We spent weeks and weeks talking to people in the less fortunate areas of Colombo to talk about people's problems. We used the people that we met in our research and created the 23 lives and the 23 characters with their dreams and their problems and aspirations into our film,” he told the BBC.
The handball team that vanished in Germany
Machan is based on the handball team that vanished in Germany in 2004
Mahendra Perera plays one of the fixers who, in real life, take $10,000 or more to send Sri Lankans to the west, usually by boat.
He said: "They think they can make their money within no time if they come here. But when they come here they'll have to do anything - they are ready to do anything to make money. So otherwise they won't fulfil their dreams”.
Machan is a comedy: it's not a heavyweight documentary.
But both Uberto Pasolini and Mahendra Parera hope it will give audiences beyond Sri Lanka an insight into the desperation which leads young men to abandon their homeland hoping for a better - or better-paid - life elsewhere.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game -Tamil Nation:
War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game
31 August 2008
[Comment by tamilnation.org
"The IPKF got rid of the hard core elements. What is left (of the LTTE) is the baby brigade of young boys and girls. They will wet their pants when they meet my armed forces..." Sinhala Sri Lanka Deputy Defence Minister, Ranjan Wijeratne, 15 July 1990
"...Linking of the land based Main Supply Route (MSR) to Jaffna through Killinochchi would be achieved by February 4, next year - I will shake hands with Pirabaharan after we defeat him" - Sinhala Sri Lanka Deputy Defence Minister, General Ratwatte, 14 December 1997 and
"We are almost at the beginning of the end. We have finished almost two thirds of the LTTE that’s about 9,000 of them which is a large number. One third of the war has to be fought. The tail enders of a cricket team do not perform the same way, like the middle order batsmen and the opening batsmen do." Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka On Democracy and the Beginning of the End]
from Ranjan Wijeratne to Anuraddha Ratwatte to Sarath Fonseka to ...]
Just like any average Tamilian possessing a modicum of common sense, I do not trust the contents of what appears in the Colombo’s daily newspapers owned by the Sinhalese media moguls. This is because they strain simple logic inculcated by our primary school teachers. Nevertheless, infrequently some material that gets published in the Colombo newspapers (especially by the Sunday Leader, an anti-SLFP organ) do some justice to common sense. One such commentary appeared in the Sunday Leader of Aug. 24, under the byline Ranjith Jayasundera. It was entitled, ‘War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game’. For those who have missed it, I reproduce the entire text below.
Here are some interesting numbers, that appear in this commentary about the current job performance of Sri Lankan armed forces, as they are purported to be “annihilating” the LTTE cadres in the North of the island. These numbers were delivered by none other than the current SL military spokesman Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara and the prime minister Ratnasiri Wickremenayake.
(1) “Over 14,000 soldiers have deserted the forces in 2008, Military Spokesman, Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara told The Sunday Leader. This figure is around 5.4% of the army's total strength over a period of just over half a year.” This works out to a desertion rate of an average 2,000 per month, until the end of July.
(2) “The military spends over Rs. 1 million on the 15 week training periods for each and every one of these soldiers, the Brigadier said.” At the current exchange rate of approximately 1US dollar being equivalent to 108 SL rupees, this works out to 9,270 dollars spent “on the 15 week training periods” for each SL soldier.
(3) “Even the lowest ranking soldier serving in an operational area would collect just under Rs 30,000 monthly, according to the military - a figure that even adjusted for inflation, is far higher than that ever paid to soldiers over the last few decades of conflict.” Thus, the SL army’s foot soldier pay of Rs. 30,000 equates to nearly 278 dollars per month.
(4) “Brig. Nanayakkara also said that during the late 1990's, the desertion rate was much higher and over 30,000 would desert the army in a year.” Isn’t this stupendous? Now, he tells us. If one has to believe this, in late 1990s (when President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Lakshman Kadirgamar were ruling the roost), the SL army was nothing but a deserter’s paradise.
(5) “The most worrying part of the Prime Minister's statement was that he said 622 - six times the number killed - soldiers were 'injured' in battle. This is not a military that counts a scratch on the arm or a broken toe as an injury. A lot of these soldiers, aged 18 and up, have been hurt so badly that their lives have been effectively shattered…In July alone for example there were over 725 soldiers either killed or injured in battle. Simply put that is an average of 23 soldiers are killed or injured every day.”
(6) Ranjith Jayasundera’s following tongue-in-cheek observation is rather cute; “over the seven months that we have been recording the Defence Ministry reports, it has been easy to spot certain amusing trends. The number of soldiers announced killed in any report is almost certainly couched towards the end of a story, and it is generally zero, one or two. The number of LTTE cadres killed however, often follows a different pattern. Often the number of Tigers reported killed would match the day of the month or the article's ID number on the Defence Ministry web site.”
For rest of the not so dignified revelations on the dilemmas faced by the SL army, please enjoy the entire text of Ranjith Jayasundera’s commentary below.
War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game by Ranjith Jayasundera [courtesy: Sunday Leader, Colombo, Aug. 24, 2008.]
When Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake ascended the stage to address an SLFP rally in the Kuruwita area of Ratnapura last week, he roared that the military was in a position to capture Kilinochchi town by yesterday (Saturday).
"We are very, very close. Kilinochchi is not very far from our site," he insisted, emphasising that "Our boys might even take Kilinochchi by August 23." Unfortunately, in a telling sign as to how much enthusiasm the government is received with in Ratnapura, the rally was practically deserted.
This, of course, the PM attributes to the fact that people were afraid to attend due to terrorist threats, according to the BBC Sandeshaya Service. It appears that as the war draws closer to an end, the level of terrorist threats seems to increase in proportion.
As startling as the Prime Minister's claim was, it was quickly rebuffed by a retired army general with political ambitions. "I am puzzled as to why always these predictions coincide with elections," was the wry comment of Major General Janaka Perera, the UNP's main candidate in yesterday's North Central Provincial Council election.
Not alone
But the Prime Minister wasn't alone in his proclamations; his was simply the most outlandish. The Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, was not far behind with his pledge that Kilinochchi will be captured by the army within the next few months.
His was a follow up to a statement by the military that the army had already entered the Kilinochchi District from an undisclosed location. Yet the Army Commander himself admitted, the military' strategy is one that might allow the LTTE insurgency to "last forever."
As many analysts have been saying since the military campaign in the Wanni started, it is one that lacks clarity or direction. At various times officials have made statements so self-contradictory that they lead to fears that - despite the ruthless professionalism emanating from the soldiers on the ground - the top brass do not know whether they are coming or going.
It also begs the question whether overall military strategy is being compromised at the altar of political expediency as was evident with Prime Minister Wickramanayake's desperate claim that Kilinochchi will be captured by election day, August 23.
Main aim
The Defence Secretary, for example, told the New York Times in a May interview that the government's main aim was "to destroy the leadership" of the LTTE. This has in the past been the work of the army's deep penetration units and air force bombers, coupling their strikes with accurate intelligence information on target positions.
But by last week the Secretary Defence had changed his mind. He told the UK's Times Online that he had to "go after (the Tigers) and completely eradicate them." His brother, President Mahinda Rajapakse has often insisted that the ongoing war was part of a humanitarian campaign to free civilians, or systematic retaliation to LTTE aggression.
Yet in the heat of the elections with opinion polls not favouring the government, the Commander in Chief too came out with his real thinking on the war while he was addressing a rally in Ruwanwella, Sabaragamuwa. "There is no turning back under any circumstances or influence now, until every inch of land is recaptured and each and every terrorist is killed or captured!" he thundered to the crowd.
Given all its contradictions, the government will find it difficult to maintain its facade of impending victory, unless it finds some form of tangible 'victory' to show to the public. Over 14,000 soldiers have deserted the forces in 2008, Military Spokesman, Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara told The Sunday Leader. This figure is around 5.4% of the army's total strength over a period of just over half a year.
Heavy expenditure
Although these soldiers are not from the army's most battle-hardened regiments, they are troops who have seen combat, and whom the military depends on to hold the territory behind its advances. The military spends over Rs. 1 million on the 15 week training periods for each and every one of these soldiers, the Brigadier said.
"That cost includes the cost of their starting salaries, paying their instructors, buying their uniforms, rations, weapons and other equipment, as well as rations and accommodation," he said. Even the lowest ranking soldier serving in an operational area would collect just under Rs 30,000 monthly, according to the military - a figure that even adjusted for inflation, is far higher than that ever paid to soldiers over the last few decades of conflict.
The general thus doubts that deserters have left the army for economic reasons and instead suggests that 'personal reasons' played a bigger role. Brig. Nanayakkara also said that during the late 1990's, the desertion rate was much higher and over 30,000 would desert the army in a year.
"Now the figures are far lower," he said. 5.5% however, is an extremely high rate of desertion for any army - enough to cause alarm. At the peak of the US military's Vietnam debacle, when a draft (effectively conscription) policy was in place and tens of thousands of American soldiers were being slaughtered, the desertion rate peaked at 5%.
Too soft
A senior military officer, who wished to remain anonymous due to a witch hunt against officers who speak with 'traitorous' journalists, felt that the military was taking the desertion issue too softly. "When we are supposed to be in a successful military campaign, 5.5% is a crazy rate. Don't forget, you're saying 5.5% out of the whole strength of the army, but that is including all from engineers to admin officers. If you look at what number of combat troops are deserting, that's a huge and scary number."
It is impossible to independently establish the ground situation faced by soldiers on the Wanni battlefront, since the military does not allow access for journalists to visit the front lines. Yet the threat of insurgency faced by the military, especially in the light of outright retreats by the LTTE, has been significantly downplayed.
Even in the cleared Eastern Province, which is now effectively the domain of Karuna and Pillayan, the military and the STF find signs of LTTE infiltration nearly every day. Barely a day has passed since Pillayan was appointed Chief Minister in May, without the military and STF either encountering an LTTE splinter cell, or discovering a stash of weapons - ranging from automatic weapons, to claymore mines, rocket propelled grenade launchers to light artillery mortars.
If this is the situation in the Eastern Province, whose former LTTE czars are on the government's side, it is easy to imagine the abundance of military hardware stashed in safe-houses and jungle hide-aways, behind the army's advances.
'Clever tricks'
Karuna himself warned last week that Pirapaharan may have some clever tricks up his sleeve. He told a news briefing in Welikanda - while out campaigning - that the LTTE would use northern civilians as blatant human shields, and use chemical weapons to try to halt the army's advances. He also took the 'credit' for the LTTE's military operations to rout the Jayasikuru campaign, and the operations to capture Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi from the army. Without him, says the Colonel, the Tigers are past their heyday.
The Sunday Leader earlier cited a research paper published by the British Medical Journal, which warned that due to errors inherent in normal casualty reporting methods, the death toll from Sri Lanka's war may be higher than 300,000 - opposed to the earlier estimate of 60 to 70 thousand.
With the government's own figures, nearly 16,000 people - of whom just fewer than 2,000 were civilians - have been killed in the past two years of conflict. This year alone over 600 security forces personnel have laid down their lives, in 'return' for the military claiming to have killed some 6,300 LTTE cadres in the same period.
The month of July has been the bloodiest yet, with the government claiming to have iced 1,017 terrorists for the loss of 106 soldiers' lives. These figures were revealed by the Prime Minister to parliament, before the entire government took off on election campaigning work.
The most worrying part of the Prime Minister's statement was that he said 622 - six times the number killed - soldiers were 'injured' in battle. This is not a military that counts a scratch on the arm or a broken toe as an injury. A lot of these soldiers, aged 18 and up, have been hurt so badly that their lives have been effectively shattered.
The stats
Also, if the government claims that nearly 12,000 Tigers have been killed between 2006 to date, surely at least a similar number must also have been maimed?
The Prime Minister's numbers for those killed last month however did not tally with our own records of news releases from the Defence Ministry.
The Ministry doles out the odd news story of a soldier who "laid his life for the motherland" or "made the supreme sacrifice" every so often, scattered amongst the banner headlines of all the hundreds of terrorists it is killing every week. The total number of soldiers admitted killed by the military itself in the month of July was just 55, almost half the 106 that Ratnasiri Wickremanayake claims were killed.
Similarly, the military's reports only allow that 299 soldiers were injured in the month of July, despite the Prime Minister's figure being double this. Although these figures cannot be verified, time and time again they are found to be untrue and reek of fabrication. The intention is obvious and there in lies the rub.
Rather than fight the war on a strategic basis to corner the Tigers what the government is doing all too obviously is dish out false propaganda simply to achieve political ends as opposed to real military successes. Thus while claiming on a daily basis that only one or two soldiers are killed as opposed to dozens of Tigers in their propaganda handouts, the government is conditioning the minds of the people on a daily basis the war is nearing end at very little human cost to the military.
Monthly statement
Then comes the monthly statement of the Prime Minister at the emergency debate giving lie to the government's own daily propaganda by stating over 100 soldiers were killed for the month with over 600 injured if July is taken as an example. That figure of course does not spell out the number of missing in action or deserters. What does this mean in real terms ? In July alone for example there were over 725 soldiers either killed or injured in battle. Simply put that is an average of 23 soldiers are killed or injured every day.
Now the purpose of highlighting this fact is not to demoralise the soldiers because they know the ground realities being in the frontlines but to impress upon the government not to fight the war through the news media to achieve narrow political ends since the truth will out and it will not do the government's credibility any good via the very people they are trying to convince.
Thus, over the seven months that we have been recording the Defence Ministry reports, it has been easy to spot certain amusing trends. The number of soldiers announced killed in any report is almost certainly couched towards the end of a story, and it is generally zero, one or two. The number of LTTE cadres killed however, often follows a different pattern. Often the number of Tigers reported killed would match the day of the month or the article's ID number on the Defence Ministry web site.
Propaganda war
Thus the Ministry is winning its war, but a propaganda war. Around Colombo the Presidential Secretariat has gotten in on the act by replacing the contents of nearly every single Colombo Municipal Council hoarding to advertise President Rajapakse and his Nelum Mal logo.
The government has set yet another target for capturing Kilinochchi, Pirapaharan's headquarters. It is well known that as the military advances, the Tigers will have nowhere to run, as the army is in place north of Elephant Pass along the Muhamalai - Nagarkovil defence line.
Thus, as the President promised, once "every inch" of land has been captured, the government would be hard pressed to explain themselves should the senior LTTE leadership manage to escape and disappear, as did Bin Laden in Afghanistan, or 900 Tigers who simply 'vanished' from a 'surrounded' Thoppigala last year.
If the military is unable to capture Pirapaharan or his top rankers, and the government proceeds to appoint another 'Karuna' out of nowhere to run shop in the Northern Province, the sinister back room dealings that took place between the President's confidants and the LTTE during and just after his presidential election may finally begin to make sense.
The government would therefore at least now do well to fight the good fight and give the valiant soldiers their due credit and respect by recognising their achievements and sacrifices without overplaying the propaganda card since before long they would have wiped out not just the LTTE but the entire Tamil population twice over if it is to simply be a numbers game alone.
31 August 2008
[Comment by tamilnation.org
"The IPKF got rid of the hard core elements. What is left (of the LTTE) is the baby brigade of young boys and girls. They will wet their pants when they meet my armed forces..." Sinhala Sri Lanka Deputy Defence Minister, Ranjan Wijeratne, 15 July 1990
"...Linking of the land based Main Supply Route (MSR) to Jaffna through Killinochchi would be achieved by February 4, next year - I will shake hands with Pirabaharan after we defeat him" - Sinhala Sri Lanka Deputy Defence Minister, General Ratwatte, 14 December 1997 and
"We are almost at the beginning of the end. We have finished almost two thirds of the LTTE that’s about 9,000 of them which is a large number. One third of the war has to be fought. The tail enders of a cricket team do not perform the same way, like the middle order batsmen and the opening batsmen do." Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka On Democracy and the Beginning of the End]
from Ranjan Wijeratne to Anuraddha Ratwatte to Sarath Fonseka to ...]
Just like any average Tamilian possessing a modicum of common sense, I do not trust the contents of what appears in the Colombo’s daily newspapers owned by the Sinhalese media moguls. This is because they strain simple logic inculcated by our primary school teachers. Nevertheless, infrequently some material that gets published in the Colombo newspapers (especially by the Sunday Leader, an anti-SLFP organ) do some justice to common sense. One such commentary appeared in the Sunday Leader of Aug. 24, under the byline Ranjith Jayasundera. It was entitled, ‘War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game’. For those who have missed it, I reproduce the entire text below.
Here are some interesting numbers, that appear in this commentary about the current job performance of Sri Lankan armed forces, as they are purported to be “annihilating” the LTTE cadres in the North of the island. These numbers were delivered by none other than the current SL military spokesman Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara and the prime minister Ratnasiri Wickremenayake.
(1) “Over 14,000 soldiers have deserted the forces in 2008, Military Spokesman, Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara told The Sunday Leader. This figure is around 5.4% of the army's total strength over a period of just over half a year.” This works out to a desertion rate of an average 2,000 per month, until the end of July.
(2) “The military spends over Rs. 1 million on the 15 week training periods for each and every one of these soldiers, the Brigadier said.” At the current exchange rate of approximately 1US dollar being equivalent to 108 SL rupees, this works out to 9,270 dollars spent “on the 15 week training periods” for each SL soldier.
(3) “Even the lowest ranking soldier serving in an operational area would collect just under Rs 30,000 monthly, according to the military - a figure that even adjusted for inflation, is far higher than that ever paid to soldiers over the last few decades of conflict.” Thus, the SL army’s foot soldier pay of Rs. 30,000 equates to nearly 278 dollars per month.
(4) “Brig. Nanayakkara also said that during the late 1990's, the desertion rate was much higher and over 30,000 would desert the army in a year.” Isn’t this stupendous? Now, he tells us. If one has to believe this, in late 1990s (when President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Lakshman Kadirgamar were ruling the roost), the SL army was nothing but a deserter’s paradise.
(5) “The most worrying part of the Prime Minister's statement was that he said 622 - six times the number killed - soldiers were 'injured' in battle. This is not a military that counts a scratch on the arm or a broken toe as an injury. A lot of these soldiers, aged 18 and up, have been hurt so badly that their lives have been effectively shattered…In July alone for example there were over 725 soldiers either killed or injured in battle. Simply put that is an average of 23 soldiers are killed or injured every day.”
(6) Ranjith Jayasundera’s following tongue-in-cheek observation is rather cute; “over the seven months that we have been recording the Defence Ministry reports, it has been easy to spot certain amusing trends. The number of soldiers announced killed in any report is almost certainly couched towards the end of a story, and it is generally zero, one or two. The number of LTTE cadres killed however, often follows a different pattern. Often the number of Tigers reported killed would match the day of the month or the article's ID number on the Defence Ministry web site.”
For rest of the not so dignified revelations on the dilemmas faced by the SL army, please enjoy the entire text of Ranjith Jayasundera’s commentary below.
War Rhetoric and the Numbers Game by Ranjith Jayasundera [courtesy: Sunday Leader, Colombo, Aug. 24, 2008.]
When Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake ascended the stage to address an SLFP rally in the Kuruwita area of Ratnapura last week, he roared that the military was in a position to capture Kilinochchi town by yesterday (Saturday).
"We are very, very close. Kilinochchi is not very far from our site," he insisted, emphasising that "Our boys might even take Kilinochchi by August 23." Unfortunately, in a telling sign as to how much enthusiasm the government is received with in Ratnapura, the rally was practically deserted.
This, of course, the PM attributes to the fact that people were afraid to attend due to terrorist threats, according to the BBC Sandeshaya Service. It appears that as the war draws closer to an end, the level of terrorist threats seems to increase in proportion.
As startling as the Prime Minister's claim was, it was quickly rebuffed by a retired army general with political ambitions. "I am puzzled as to why always these predictions coincide with elections," was the wry comment of Major General Janaka Perera, the UNP's main candidate in yesterday's North Central Provincial Council election.
Not alone
But the Prime Minister wasn't alone in his proclamations; his was simply the most outlandish. The Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, was not far behind with his pledge that Kilinochchi will be captured by the army within the next few months.
His was a follow up to a statement by the military that the army had already entered the Kilinochchi District from an undisclosed location. Yet the Army Commander himself admitted, the military' strategy is one that might allow the LTTE insurgency to "last forever."
As many analysts have been saying since the military campaign in the Wanni started, it is one that lacks clarity or direction. At various times officials have made statements so self-contradictory that they lead to fears that - despite the ruthless professionalism emanating from the soldiers on the ground - the top brass do not know whether they are coming or going.
It also begs the question whether overall military strategy is being compromised at the altar of political expediency as was evident with Prime Minister Wickramanayake's desperate claim that Kilinochchi will be captured by election day, August 23.
Main aim
The Defence Secretary, for example, told the New York Times in a May interview that the government's main aim was "to destroy the leadership" of the LTTE. This has in the past been the work of the army's deep penetration units and air force bombers, coupling their strikes with accurate intelligence information on target positions.
But by last week the Secretary Defence had changed his mind. He told the UK's Times Online that he had to "go after (the Tigers) and completely eradicate them." His brother, President Mahinda Rajapakse has often insisted that the ongoing war was part of a humanitarian campaign to free civilians, or systematic retaliation to LTTE aggression.
Yet in the heat of the elections with opinion polls not favouring the government, the Commander in Chief too came out with his real thinking on the war while he was addressing a rally in Ruwanwella, Sabaragamuwa. "There is no turning back under any circumstances or influence now, until every inch of land is recaptured and each and every terrorist is killed or captured!" he thundered to the crowd.
Given all its contradictions, the government will find it difficult to maintain its facade of impending victory, unless it finds some form of tangible 'victory' to show to the public. Over 14,000 soldiers have deserted the forces in 2008, Military Spokesman, Brigadier General Udaya Nanayakkara told The Sunday Leader. This figure is around 5.4% of the army's total strength over a period of just over half a year.
Heavy expenditure
Although these soldiers are not from the army's most battle-hardened regiments, they are troops who have seen combat, and whom the military depends on to hold the territory behind its advances. The military spends over Rs. 1 million on the 15 week training periods for each and every one of these soldiers, the Brigadier said.
"That cost includes the cost of their starting salaries, paying their instructors, buying their uniforms, rations, weapons and other equipment, as well as rations and accommodation," he said. Even the lowest ranking soldier serving in an operational area would collect just under Rs 30,000 monthly, according to the military - a figure that even adjusted for inflation, is far higher than that ever paid to soldiers over the last few decades of conflict.
The general thus doubts that deserters have left the army for economic reasons and instead suggests that 'personal reasons' played a bigger role. Brig. Nanayakkara also said that during the late 1990's, the desertion rate was much higher and over 30,000 would desert the army in a year.
"Now the figures are far lower," he said. 5.5% however, is an extremely high rate of desertion for any army - enough to cause alarm. At the peak of the US military's Vietnam debacle, when a draft (effectively conscription) policy was in place and tens of thousands of American soldiers were being slaughtered, the desertion rate peaked at 5%.
Too soft
A senior military officer, who wished to remain anonymous due to a witch hunt against officers who speak with 'traitorous' journalists, felt that the military was taking the desertion issue too softly. "When we are supposed to be in a successful military campaign, 5.5% is a crazy rate. Don't forget, you're saying 5.5% out of the whole strength of the army, but that is including all from engineers to admin officers. If you look at what number of combat troops are deserting, that's a huge and scary number."
It is impossible to independently establish the ground situation faced by soldiers on the Wanni battlefront, since the military does not allow access for journalists to visit the front lines. Yet the threat of insurgency faced by the military, especially in the light of outright retreats by the LTTE, has been significantly downplayed.
Even in the cleared Eastern Province, which is now effectively the domain of Karuna and Pillayan, the military and the STF find signs of LTTE infiltration nearly every day. Barely a day has passed since Pillayan was appointed Chief Minister in May, without the military and STF either encountering an LTTE splinter cell, or discovering a stash of weapons - ranging from automatic weapons, to claymore mines, rocket propelled grenade launchers to light artillery mortars.
If this is the situation in the Eastern Province, whose former LTTE czars are on the government's side, it is easy to imagine the abundance of military hardware stashed in safe-houses and jungle hide-aways, behind the army's advances.
'Clever tricks'
Karuna himself warned last week that Pirapaharan may have some clever tricks up his sleeve. He told a news briefing in Welikanda - while out campaigning - that the LTTE would use northern civilians as blatant human shields, and use chemical weapons to try to halt the army's advances. He also took the 'credit' for the LTTE's military operations to rout the Jayasikuru campaign, and the operations to capture Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi from the army. Without him, says the Colonel, the Tigers are past their heyday.
The Sunday Leader earlier cited a research paper published by the British Medical Journal, which warned that due to errors inherent in normal casualty reporting methods, the death toll from Sri Lanka's war may be higher than 300,000 - opposed to the earlier estimate of 60 to 70 thousand.
With the government's own figures, nearly 16,000 people - of whom just fewer than 2,000 were civilians - have been killed in the past two years of conflict. This year alone over 600 security forces personnel have laid down their lives, in 'return' for the military claiming to have killed some 6,300 LTTE cadres in the same period.
The month of July has been the bloodiest yet, with the government claiming to have iced 1,017 terrorists for the loss of 106 soldiers' lives. These figures were revealed by the Prime Minister to parliament, before the entire government took off on election campaigning work.
The most worrying part of the Prime Minister's statement was that he said 622 - six times the number killed - soldiers were 'injured' in battle. This is not a military that counts a scratch on the arm or a broken toe as an injury. A lot of these soldiers, aged 18 and up, have been hurt so badly that their lives have been effectively shattered.
The stats
Also, if the government claims that nearly 12,000 Tigers have been killed between 2006 to date, surely at least a similar number must also have been maimed?
The Prime Minister's numbers for those killed last month however did not tally with our own records of news releases from the Defence Ministry.
The Ministry doles out the odd news story of a soldier who "laid his life for the motherland" or "made the supreme sacrifice" every so often, scattered amongst the banner headlines of all the hundreds of terrorists it is killing every week. The total number of soldiers admitted killed by the military itself in the month of July was just 55, almost half the 106 that Ratnasiri Wickremanayake claims were killed.
Similarly, the military's reports only allow that 299 soldiers were injured in the month of July, despite the Prime Minister's figure being double this. Although these figures cannot be verified, time and time again they are found to be untrue and reek of fabrication. The intention is obvious and there in lies the rub.
Rather than fight the war on a strategic basis to corner the Tigers what the government is doing all too obviously is dish out false propaganda simply to achieve political ends as opposed to real military successes. Thus while claiming on a daily basis that only one or two soldiers are killed as opposed to dozens of Tigers in their propaganda handouts, the government is conditioning the minds of the people on a daily basis the war is nearing end at very little human cost to the military.
Monthly statement
Then comes the monthly statement of the Prime Minister at the emergency debate giving lie to the government's own daily propaganda by stating over 100 soldiers were killed for the month with over 600 injured if July is taken as an example. That figure of course does not spell out the number of missing in action or deserters. What does this mean in real terms ? In July alone for example there were over 725 soldiers either killed or injured in battle. Simply put that is an average of 23 soldiers are killed or injured every day.
Now the purpose of highlighting this fact is not to demoralise the soldiers because they know the ground realities being in the frontlines but to impress upon the government not to fight the war through the news media to achieve narrow political ends since the truth will out and it will not do the government's credibility any good via the very people they are trying to convince.
Thus, over the seven months that we have been recording the Defence Ministry reports, it has been easy to spot certain amusing trends. The number of soldiers announced killed in any report is almost certainly couched towards the end of a story, and it is generally zero, one or two. The number of LTTE cadres killed however, often follows a different pattern. Often the number of Tigers reported killed would match the day of the month or the article's ID number on the Defence Ministry web site.
Propaganda war
Thus the Ministry is winning its war, but a propaganda war. Around Colombo the Presidential Secretariat has gotten in on the act by replacing the contents of nearly every single Colombo Municipal Council hoarding to advertise President Rajapakse and his Nelum Mal logo.
The government has set yet another target for capturing Kilinochchi, Pirapaharan's headquarters. It is well known that as the military advances, the Tigers will have nowhere to run, as the army is in place north of Elephant Pass along the Muhamalai - Nagarkovil defence line.
Thus, as the President promised, once "every inch" of land has been captured, the government would be hard pressed to explain themselves should the senior LTTE leadership manage to escape and disappear, as did Bin Laden in Afghanistan, or 900 Tigers who simply 'vanished' from a 'surrounded' Thoppigala last year.
If the military is unable to capture Pirapaharan or his top rankers, and the government proceeds to appoint another 'Karuna' out of nowhere to run shop in the Northern Province, the sinister back room dealings that took place between the President's confidants and the LTTE during and just after his presidential election may finally begin to make sense.
The government would therefore at least now do well to fight the good fight and give the valiant soldiers their due credit and respect by recognising their achievements and sacrifices without overplaying the propaganda card since before long they would have wiped out not just the LTTE but the entire Tamil population twice over if it is to simply be a numbers game alone.
Hambantota port being built by China points to Beijing's jockeying with India for regional influence.
The latest 'great game' involves Indian Ocean
A Sri Lankan port being built by China points to Beijing's jockeying with India for regional influence.
By Gavin Rabinowitz, Associated Press
August 31, 2008
HAMBANTOTA, SRI LANKA -- This battered harbor town on Sri Lanka's southern tip, with its scrawny men selling even scrawnier fish, seems an unlikely focus for an emerging international competition over the energy supply routes that fuel much of the global economy.
An impoverished place still recovering from the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Hambantota has a desolate air, a sense of nowhereness, punctuated by the realization that looking south over the expanse of ocean, the next landfall is Antarctica.
But just over the horizon runs one of the world's great trade arteries, the shipping lanes where thousands of vessels carry oil from the Middle East and raw materials to Asia, returning with television sets, toys and sneakers for European consumers.
These tankers provide 80% of China's oil and 65% of India's -- fuel desperately needed for the two countries' rapidly growing economies. Japan is almost totally dependent on energy supplies shipped through the Indian Ocean.
Any disruption -- from terrorism, piracy, natural disaster or war -- could have devastating effects on these countries and, in an increasingly interdependent world, send ripples across the globe. When an unidentified ship attacked a Japanese oil tanker traveling through the Indian Ocean from South Korea to Saudi Arabia in April, the news sent oil prices to record highs.
For decades the world relied on the U.S. Navy to protect this sea lane. But as India and China gain economic heft, they are moving to expand their control of the waterway, sparking a new, and potentially dangerous, rivalry between Asia's emerging giants.
China has given massive aid to Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts, building ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and reportedly setting up a listening post on one of Myanmar's islands near the strategic Strait of Malacca.
Now, India is trying to parry China's moves. It beat out China for a port project in Myanmar. And, flush with cash from its expanding economy, India is beefing up its military, with the expansion seemingly aimed at China. Washington and, to a lesser extent, Tokyo are encouraging India's role as a counterweight to growing Chinese power.
Among China's latest moves is the billion-dollar port its engineers are building in Sri Lanka.
The Chinese insist the Hambantota port is a purely commercial move, and by all appearances, it is. But some in India see ominous designs behind the project, while others in countries surrounding India like the idea. A 2004 Pentagon report called Beijing's effort to expand its presence in the region China's "string of pearls."
Relations between China and India are at their closest since a brief 1962 border war in which China quickly routed Indian forces. Last year, trade between India and China grew to $37 billion, and their two armies conducted their first joint military exercise.
Still, the Indians worry about China's growing influence.
"Each pearl in the string is a link in a chain of the Chinese maritime presence," India's navy chief, Adm. Sureesh Mehta, said in a speech in January, expressing concern that naval forces operating out of ports established by the Chinese could "take control over the world energy jugular."
"It is a pincer movement," said Rahul Bedi, a South Asia analyst with London-based Jane's Defense Weekly. "That, together with the slap India got in 1962, keeps them awake at night."
B. Raman, a hawkish, retired Indian intelligence official, expressed the fears of some Indians over the Chinese-built ports, saying he believes they'll be used as naval bases to control the area.
"We cannot take them at face value. We cannot assume their intentions are benign," said Raman.
But Zhao Gancheng, a South Asia expert at the Chinese government-backed Shanghai Institute for International Studies, says ports like Hambantota are strictly commercial ventures. And Sri Lanka says the new port will be a windfall for its impoverished southern region.
With Sri Lanka's proximity to the shipping lane already making it a hub for transshipping containers between Europe and Asia, the new port will boost the country's annual cargo handling capacity from 6 million containers to about 23 million, said Priyath Wickrama, deputy director of the Sri Lankan Ports Authority.
Wickrama said a new facility was needed because the main port in the capital, Colombo, had no room to expand and Trincomalee port in the northeast was caught in the middle of Sri Lanka's separatist war. Hambantota also will have factories on-site producing cement and fertilizer for export, he said.
Meanwhile, India is gearing its military expansion toward China, and has set up listening stations in Mozambique and Madagascar, in part to monitor Chinese movements, Bedi noted. It also has an air base in Kazakhstan and a space monitoring post in Mongolia -- both China's neighbors.
India has announced plans to have a fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in the next decade and recently tested nuclear-capable missiles that put China's major cities well within range. It also is reopening air force bases near the Chinese border.
Encouraging India's role as a counter to China, the U.S. has stepped up exercises with the Indian navy and last year sold it an American warship for the first time, the 17,000-ton amphibious transport dock Trenton. American defense contractors -- shut out from the lucrative Indian market during the long Cold War -- have been offering India's military everything from advanced fighter jets to anti-ship missiles.
"It is in our interest to develop this relationship," U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a visit to New Delhi in February. "Just as it is in the Indians' interest."
Officially, China says it's not worried about India's military buildup or its closer ties with the U.S. However, foreign analysts believe China is deeply concerned by the possibility of a U.S.-Indian military alliance.
Ian Storey of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore said China sent strong diplomatic messages expressing opposition to a massive naval exercise India held last year with the U.S., Japan, Singapore and Australia. And Bedi, the Jane's analyst, added "those exercises rattled the Chinese."
India's 2007 defense budget was about $21.7 billion, up 7.8% from 2006. China said its 2008 military budget would jump 17.6% to about $59 billion, following a similar increase last year. The U.S. estimates China's actual defense spending may be much higher.
Like India, China is focusing on its navy, building an increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet that could become one of the world's largest.
Though analysts believe China's military buildup is mostly focused on preventing U.S. intervention in any conflict with Taiwan, India is still likely to persist in efforts to catch up as China expands its influence in what is essentially India's backyard. Meanwhile, Sri Lankans -- who have looked warily for centuries at vast India to the north -- welcome the Chinese investment in their country.
"Our lives are going to change," said 62-year-old Jayasena Senanayake, who has seen business grow at his roadside food stall since construction began on the nearby port. "What China is doing for us is very good."
Associated Press writer Christopher Bodeen contributed to this report from Beijing.
end:
T4J COMMENTS: IT IS MORE PARANOIA THAN FACTS.
BY THE WAY, CHINA IS NOT GIVING AID, BUT JUST A LOAN AND WINNING THE CONTRACT TO BUILD, WITH HIGH PROFITS. THE PORT WILL BE A COMMERCIAL DISASTER AND WHITE ELEPHANT OF A PROJECT FOR PEOPLE WHO COMPREHEND SHIPPING. THAT IS WHY FOR CENTURIES EVEN WITH SMALL SAILING SHIPS OPERATING, THE FRENCH, CHINESESE, PORTUGESE,DUTCH NOR THE BRITISH DID NOT BUILD EVEN A FISHERIES HARBOR IN HAMBANTOTA. THIS IS RAJAPAKSE'S GRANDIOSE DREAMS.
21ST CENTURY HAS MORE MODERN, FAST, AND SOPHISTICATED SHIPS WHICH CAN GO FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, OR RED SEA PORTS TO SINGAPORE WHERE THE FUEL AND OTHER SERVICES ARE CHEAP AND EFFICIENT, WITH A SUPER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND REPAIR YARDS, AS WELL AS CARGO. HAMBANTOTA HAS NOTHING, AND IS ONLY 3 DAYS FROM SINGAPORE.
A Sri Lankan port being built by China points to Beijing's jockeying with India for regional influence.
By Gavin Rabinowitz, Associated Press
August 31, 2008
HAMBANTOTA, SRI LANKA -- This battered harbor town on Sri Lanka's southern tip, with its scrawny men selling even scrawnier fish, seems an unlikely focus for an emerging international competition over the energy supply routes that fuel much of the global economy.
An impoverished place still recovering from the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Hambantota has a desolate air, a sense of nowhereness, punctuated by the realization that looking south over the expanse of ocean, the next landfall is Antarctica.
But just over the horizon runs one of the world's great trade arteries, the shipping lanes where thousands of vessels carry oil from the Middle East and raw materials to Asia, returning with television sets, toys and sneakers for European consumers.
These tankers provide 80% of China's oil and 65% of India's -- fuel desperately needed for the two countries' rapidly growing economies. Japan is almost totally dependent on energy supplies shipped through the Indian Ocean.
Any disruption -- from terrorism, piracy, natural disaster or war -- could have devastating effects on these countries and, in an increasingly interdependent world, send ripples across the globe. When an unidentified ship attacked a Japanese oil tanker traveling through the Indian Ocean from South Korea to Saudi Arabia in April, the news sent oil prices to record highs.
For decades the world relied on the U.S. Navy to protect this sea lane. But as India and China gain economic heft, they are moving to expand their control of the waterway, sparking a new, and potentially dangerous, rivalry between Asia's emerging giants.
China has given massive aid to Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts, building ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and reportedly setting up a listening post on one of Myanmar's islands near the strategic Strait of Malacca.
Now, India is trying to parry China's moves. It beat out China for a port project in Myanmar. And, flush with cash from its expanding economy, India is beefing up its military, with the expansion seemingly aimed at China. Washington and, to a lesser extent, Tokyo are encouraging India's role as a counterweight to growing Chinese power.
Among China's latest moves is the billion-dollar port its engineers are building in Sri Lanka.
The Chinese insist the Hambantota port is a purely commercial move, and by all appearances, it is. But some in India see ominous designs behind the project, while others in countries surrounding India like the idea. A 2004 Pentagon report called Beijing's effort to expand its presence in the region China's "string of pearls."
Relations between China and India are at their closest since a brief 1962 border war in which China quickly routed Indian forces. Last year, trade between India and China grew to $37 billion, and their two armies conducted their first joint military exercise.
Still, the Indians worry about China's growing influence.
"Each pearl in the string is a link in a chain of the Chinese maritime presence," India's navy chief, Adm. Sureesh Mehta, said in a speech in January, expressing concern that naval forces operating out of ports established by the Chinese could "take control over the world energy jugular."
"It is a pincer movement," said Rahul Bedi, a South Asia analyst with London-based Jane's Defense Weekly. "That, together with the slap India got in 1962, keeps them awake at night."
B. Raman, a hawkish, retired Indian intelligence official, expressed the fears of some Indians over the Chinese-built ports, saying he believes they'll be used as naval bases to control the area.
"We cannot take them at face value. We cannot assume their intentions are benign," said Raman.
But Zhao Gancheng, a South Asia expert at the Chinese government-backed Shanghai Institute for International Studies, says ports like Hambantota are strictly commercial ventures. And Sri Lanka says the new port will be a windfall for its impoverished southern region.
With Sri Lanka's proximity to the shipping lane already making it a hub for transshipping containers between Europe and Asia, the new port will boost the country's annual cargo handling capacity from 6 million containers to about 23 million, said Priyath Wickrama, deputy director of the Sri Lankan Ports Authority.
Wickrama said a new facility was needed because the main port in the capital, Colombo, had no room to expand and Trincomalee port in the northeast was caught in the middle of Sri Lanka's separatist war. Hambantota also will have factories on-site producing cement and fertilizer for export, he said.
Meanwhile, India is gearing its military expansion toward China, and has set up listening stations in Mozambique and Madagascar, in part to monitor Chinese movements, Bedi noted. It also has an air base in Kazakhstan and a space monitoring post in Mongolia -- both China's neighbors.
India has announced plans to have a fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in the next decade and recently tested nuclear-capable missiles that put China's major cities well within range. It also is reopening air force bases near the Chinese border.
Encouraging India's role as a counter to China, the U.S. has stepped up exercises with the Indian navy and last year sold it an American warship for the first time, the 17,000-ton amphibious transport dock Trenton. American defense contractors -- shut out from the lucrative Indian market during the long Cold War -- have been offering India's military everything from advanced fighter jets to anti-ship missiles.
"It is in our interest to develop this relationship," U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a visit to New Delhi in February. "Just as it is in the Indians' interest."
Officially, China says it's not worried about India's military buildup or its closer ties with the U.S. However, foreign analysts believe China is deeply concerned by the possibility of a U.S.-Indian military alliance.
Ian Storey of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore said China sent strong diplomatic messages expressing opposition to a massive naval exercise India held last year with the U.S., Japan, Singapore and Australia. And Bedi, the Jane's analyst, added "those exercises rattled the Chinese."
India's 2007 defense budget was about $21.7 billion, up 7.8% from 2006. China said its 2008 military budget would jump 17.6% to about $59 billion, following a similar increase last year. The U.S. estimates China's actual defense spending may be much higher.
Like India, China is focusing on its navy, building an increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet that could become one of the world's largest.
Though analysts believe China's military buildup is mostly focused on preventing U.S. intervention in any conflict with Taiwan, India is still likely to persist in efforts to catch up as China expands its influence in what is essentially India's backyard. Meanwhile, Sri Lankans -- who have looked warily for centuries at vast India to the north -- welcome the Chinese investment in their country.
"Our lives are going to change," said 62-year-old Jayasena Senanayake, who has seen business grow at his roadside food stall since construction began on the nearby port. "What China is doing for us is very good."
Associated Press writer Christopher Bodeen contributed to this report from Beijing.
end:
T4J COMMENTS: IT IS MORE PARANOIA THAN FACTS.
BY THE WAY, CHINA IS NOT GIVING AID, BUT JUST A LOAN AND WINNING THE CONTRACT TO BUILD, WITH HIGH PROFITS. THE PORT WILL BE A COMMERCIAL DISASTER AND WHITE ELEPHANT OF A PROJECT FOR PEOPLE WHO COMPREHEND SHIPPING. THAT IS WHY FOR CENTURIES EVEN WITH SMALL SAILING SHIPS OPERATING, THE FRENCH, CHINESESE, PORTUGESE,DUTCH NOR THE BRITISH DID NOT BUILD EVEN A FISHERIES HARBOR IN HAMBANTOTA. THIS IS RAJAPAKSE'S GRANDIOSE DREAMS.
21ST CENTURY HAS MORE MODERN, FAST, AND SOPHISTICATED SHIPS WHICH CAN GO FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, OR RED SEA PORTS TO SINGAPORE WHERE THE FUEL AND OTHER SERVICES ARE CHEAP AND EFFICIENT, WITH A SUPER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND REPAIR YARDS, AS WELL AS CARGO. HAMBANTOTA HAS NOTHING, AND IS ONLY 3 DAYS FROM SINGAPORE.
The Travails of the Tamils in Vanni: Eye Witness Account:
The Plight of Vanni Refugees:
"When shells started falling in the vicinity of our tank, I knew that the dreaded moment had come. We collected all what we could and left with a heavy heart. Leaving the paddy behind was very hurting. I felt I was deserting the paddy I had nurtured, irrigated, fertilized, invested all my savings in and toiled over so much. It is a feeling one can only realize by experiencing it and not through expressing in words."
by K. Mylvaganam, reporting from Vanni
(August 31, Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sambur, Muthur and Vaharai tragedies are being repeated in Vanni. The only difference is the Internally Displaced People (IDP) from the above mentioned areas were driven into the army-controlled areas. But those vacated their residences from places like Mannar, Madhu, Vavuniya North, Vavunikulam, Vannerikulam and Akkarayankulam, Manalaru and Oddusuddan have moved towards the heart of Vanni, which is under the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Even though the refugees, who moved towards the heart of Vanni, have escaped from the indiscriminate shelling from the artillery by vacating from their places of residence and their work places, yet they are subject to vicious aerial bombings around their temporary shelters. Even the circling of the bombers over their heads makes them shiver. There are instances where pregnant mothers have had sudden abortions as well. Small children from among the IDPs, unable to absorb all these displacements, unfamiliar environments and new faces, have difficulties in coping with the changes. Missing their friends and their school has had adverse effects on them. Above all, the roaring noise of the bombers terrifies them very severely. These have caused nervous problems among many of them. While I was in a refugee camp, an ever-silver cup was accidentally dropped on the floor. I noticed how the children got agitated and reacted over that noise. The nervous look of fear on their faces spoke of their mental status. Some even screamed on hearing the fall of the cup. According to the parents, some children have turned unusually aggressive. They refuse to eat and even obey the parents.
I spoke to a few and the experience of one of them is given below. His narration will hold good for most of the IDPs.
Ramasamy Sundaram states:
“We are from Poonakari and have four children, two girls and two boys. They all are between ten and five. I own a two acre paddy field apart from the half an acre of high land, where I had nine goats, three cows and some poultry. I have put all my savings into the paddy field. People living a few kilometres south of our village were moving through our village as their village was subject to shelling. This caused panic among us. We were aware that it won’t be long before the same fate will befall on us as well. The harvest should begin by the end of this month or in the first week of September. Even though there was a wishful thinking in my mind that the enemy will not come closer to us, but common sense was pointing to the opposite. If we are to move, what to do with all what we have, what and what we can take with us and how to transport them, and where to go were the questions that we were confronted with. Questions were aplenty but answers were nil. A trailer will cost around Rs.6, 000.00 to 10,000.00 depending on the distance of our destination. My biggest worry was the paddy field. I have put all our savings into it and if I have to leave before the harvest I will become a pauper. I have been a farmer all my life and if we have to move where shall we move to? What can I do for our living? Since lakhs and lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of people are on the move, everyone like me will also be looking out to work as a labourer. Then the competition will rise and the emolument will sink or unemployment will prevail. I felt awful to see the frightened faces of my wife and children, all of whom are school-going kids. One thing I was certain and it was that the decision had to be taken and taken very soon, as the sounds of the shells were nearing. It is an awful feeling and the trauma I underwent at that time was horrible.
This is a picture of a single mother with four kids in the hot sun, tired of walking. She stopped to pause for this photo. She said that her husband succumbed recently to an artillery shell by the SL army. As one can see, she is empty handed and had no possessions to carry. I dread to think what her future has in store for her and how I wwould feel if I were in her shoes.
When shells started falling in the vicinity of our tank, I knew that the dreaded moment had come. We collected all what we could and left with a heavy heart. Leaving the paddy behind was very hurting. I felt I was deserting the paddy I had nurtured, irrigated, fertilized, invested all my savings in and toiled over so much. It is a feeling one can only realize by experiencing it and not through expressing in words.
We reached Mullankavil, where we were sheltered in temporary sheds. There was no privacy as too many people were put in there.
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation gave us cooked food for two days and thereafter some International Organisation provided us with dry rations. Another such organisation gave us some bedding and some cooking utensils.
This picture needs no description. Two days after these pictures were taken there was a down pour of rain on two consecutive days. The school in the background was already filled with refugees, who reached there earlier.
After some time, the shelling started falling closer to Mullankavil as well. Hence, we had to move again and now we are in Mutkomban. The sanitation here is very unsatisfactory. Drinking water is in short supply but for bathing and washing clothes there is a tank close by. After having led a fairly comfortable life in our own house, this is something we never expected to happen overnight; nor do we deserve it, because we did no harm to anyone.
From here whereto next is in the minds of all those in this camp. But no one has the answer.”
I took several photos and spoke with many and listened to their heart-rendering and distressing episodes. Unfortunately, everything cannot be included in this article. Some were sick and there were pregnant mothers also.
The statistics obtained from the Government Agents of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi are appended. These reflect the numbers as on 21.08.2008. But people are still on the move even after the above date. You will note that a total number of 249,527 persons have already become IDPs within a short period. It is almost a quarter million. And how many more to come, nobody knows.
Some people have moved even to four or five refugees camps in different areas as the artillary shell were following them from behind.
My humble appeal to our Tamil Diaspora is to contact the TRO, SEDOT or any authorised representatives of the Tamils in your areas and impart what ever financial help you can to eliviate the miseries of these IDPs.
Kindly do not wait for them to come to you. You go to them please. These IDPs need your help urgently.
"When shells started falling in the vicinity of our tank, I knew that the dreaded moment had come. We collected all what we could and left with a heavy heart. Leaving the paddy behind was very hurting. I felt I was deserting the paddy I had nurtured, irrigated, fertilized, invested all my savings in and toiled over so much. It is a feeling one can only realize by experiencing it and not through expressing in words."
by K. Mylvaganam, reporting from Vanni
(August 31, Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sambur, Muthur and Vaharai tragedies are being repeated in Vanni. The only difference is the Internally Displaced People (IDP) from the above mentioned areas were driven into the army-controlled areas. But those vacated their residences from places like Mannar, Madhu, Vavuniya North, Vavunikulam, Vannerikulam and Akkarayankulam, Manalaru and Oddusuddan have moved towards the heart of Vanni, which is under the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Even though the refugees, who moved towards the heart of Vanni, have escaped from the indiscriminate shelling from the artillery by vacating from their places of residence and their work places, yet they are subject to vicious aerial bombings around their temporary shelters. Even the circling of the bombers over their heads makes them shiver. There are instances where pregnant mothers have had sudden abortions as well. Small children from among the IDPs, unable to absorb all these displacements, unfamiliar environments and new faces, have difficulties in coping with the changes. Missing their friends and their school has had adverse effects on them. Above all, the roaring noise of the bombers terrifies them very severely. These have caused nervous problems among many of them. While I was in a refugee camp, an ever-silver cup was accidentally dropped on the floor. I noticed how the children got agitated and reacted over that noise. The nervous look of fear on their faces spoke of their mental status. Some even screamed on hearing the fall of the cup. According to the parents, some children have turned unusually aggressive. They refuse to eat and even obey the parents.
I spoke to a few and the experience of one of them is given below. His narration will hold good for most of the IDPs.
Ramasamy Sundaram states:
“We are from Poonakari and have four children, two girls and two boys. They all are between ten and five. I own a two acre paddy field apart from the half an acre of high land, where I had nine goats, three cows and some poultry. I have put all my savings into the paddy field. People living a few kilometres south of our village were moving through our village as their village was subject to shelling. This caused panic among us. We were aware that it won’t be long before the same fate will befall on us as well. The harvest should begin by the end of this month or in the first week of September. Even though there was a wishful thinking in my mind that the enemy will not come closer to us, but common sense was pointing to the opposite. If we are to move, what to do with all what we have, what and what we can take with us and how to transport them, and where to go were the questions that we were confronted with. Questions were aplenty but answers were nil. A trailer will cost around Rs.6, 000.00 to 10,000.00 depending on the distance of our destination. My biggest worry was the paddy field. I have put all our savings into it and if I have to leave before the harvest I will become a pauper. I have been a farmer all my life and if we have to move where shall we move to? What can I do for our living? Since lakhs and lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of people are on the move, everyone like me will also be looking out to work as a labourer. Then the competition will rise and the emolument will sink or unemployment will prevail. I felt awful to see the frightened faces of my wife and children, all of whom are school-going kids. One thing I was certain and it was that the decision had to be taken and taken very soon, as the sounds of the shells were nearing. It is an awful feeling and the trauma I underwent at that time was horrible.
This is a picture of a single mother with four kids in the hot sun, tired of walking. She stopped to pause for this photo. She said that her husband succumbed recently to an artillery shell by the SL army. As one can see, she is empty handed and had no possessions to carry. I dread to think what her future has in store for her and how I wwould feel if I were in her shoes.
When shells started falling in the vicinity of our tank, I knew that the dreaded moment had come. We collected all what we could and left with a heavy heart. Leaving the paddy behind was very hurting. I felt I was deserting the paddy I had nurtured, irrigated, fertilized, invested all my savings in and toiled over so much. It is a feeling one can only realize by experiencing it and not through expressing in words.
We reached Mullankavil, where we were sheltered in temporary sheds. There was no privacy as too many people were put in there.
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation gave us cooked food for two days and thereafter some International Organisation provided us with dry rations. Another such organisation gave us some bedding and some cooking utensils.
This picture needs no description. Two days after these pictures were taken there was a down pour of rain on two consecutive days. The school in the background was already filled with refugees, who reached there earlier.
After some time, the shelling started falling closer to Mullankavil as well. Hence, we had to move again and now we are in Mutkomban. The sanitation here is very unsatisfactory. Drinking water is in short supply but for bathing and washing clothes there is a tank close by. After having led a fairly comfortable life in our own house, this is something we never expected to happen overnight; nor do we deserve it, because we did no harm to anyone.
From here whereto next is in the minds of all those in this camp. But no one has the answer.”
I took several photos and spoke with many and listened to their heart-rendering and distressing episodes. Unfortunately, everything cannot be included in this article. Some were sick and there were pregnant mothers also.
The statistics obtained from the Government Agents of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi are appended. These reflect the numbers as on 21.08.2008. But people are still on the move even after the above date. You will note that a total number of 249,527 persons have already become IDPs within a short period. It is almost a quarter million. And how many more to come, nobody knows.
Some people have moved even to four or five refugees camps in different areas as the artillary shell were following them from behind.
My humble appeal to our Tamil Diaspora is to contact the TRO, SEDOT or any authorised representatives of the Tamils in your areas and impart what ever financial help you can to eliviate the miseries of these IDPs.
Kindly do not wait for them to come to you. You go to them please. These IDPs need your help urgently.
Saturday, August 30, 2008
THE BOMBING OF TRINCOMALEE BY THE FLYING TIGERS:
Situation report
The grave story of the "ghost" aircraft
* LTTE air wing's first strike for 2008 causes deaths, damage and poses questions
* Main target missed but danger of flying bomb increases
Last Tuesday (August 26) was a cloudy night in eastern Sri Lanka. At a jetty in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Sri Lanka Navy's eastern headquarters, there was hectic activity.
Troops were preparing to board the "Jetliner," the transport vessel acquired from an Indonesian company. It is capable of carrying some 3,000 passengers besides cargo. At dawn next day this vessel was to begin its voyage to Kankesanthurai (KKS)
Two of three bombs dropped by Tiger guerrilla aircraft last Tuesday night fell on the multi-storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa at the Navy’s Eastern Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Here is a section of the roof damaged by the bombing. One bomb that fell on the roof of a building nearby did not explode.
If maritime movements with logistics from Trincomalee to KKS serve as the umbilical cord for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, the "Jetliner" plays a pivotal role. It is the main mode of transport for troops and police officers. They either take the seaward journey for deployment or when returning home on leave.
Amidst all activity that night, the Operations Room at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters received reports of what was suspected to be advancing Tiger guerrilla aircraft. It was just one minute to 9 p.m. This was after naval craft at sea observed echoes on their radar screens. Telephones of the various units at Dockyard went busy. Soon air defence gun positions directed fire into the night sky. So did navy patrol craft at sea. Even some troops deployed in the Trincomalee town area directed rifle fire into the night sky. Yet, none was able to observe the intruding aircraft. It was dark and raining.
Just then, loud explosions rendered the air. Bombs were falling. The first fell on the Civil Engineering Yard causing extensive damage to buildings. It is located opposite the CNAD or the Ceylon National Armoured Depot. The CNAD has been in existence from the time of the British who had their base at the Dockyard during World War II. Three others fell on the multi storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa. Two bombs exploded and one that fell on a roof did not. Four sailors were killed on the spot. Thirty-five more were wounded, a large number sustaining minor injuries. Seven of those seriously injured were later airlifted to Colombo. In all, four bombs were dropped. Three had exploded and one remained intact.
Tamilnet picture shows LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran posing with “pilots” and staff of his “Air Wing” reportedly after last Tuesday’s air raid on Sri Lanka Navy’s Eastern Headquarters in Trincomalee.
Earlier that day, there had also been another unexpected tragedy. A sailor in a dinghy who went around placing depth charges in the seas around the Navy’s eastern headquarters area died when one of them exploded prematurely. These depth charges are timed to explode under water to prevent infiltration by guerrilla divers. The explosions trigger strong under water waves capable of causing devastating effects on intruders including the bursting of ear drums.
Independent of this development, the Navy had also alerted the Air Defence Control and Command Centre (ADC & C) located at the Air Force base in Katunayake. The guerrilla aircraft, they determined, had flown low from somewhere in Mullaitivu towards Trincomalee. (See map for suspected flight path). Reports said that the guerrilla aircraft was some 57 kilometres away from Trincomalee then. The SLAF base in Katunayake went into action following Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).
It was some 19 minutes later when two Chinese built F-7 interceptor jets equipped with air-to-air missiles scoured into the skies. They gave chase to the guerrilla aircraft. It was a case of the enemy aircraft being located too close. However, they had yet got away away. On the ground, Air Force personnel were tracking the movement of the returning guerrilla aircraft using 2-D radars. With this radar, they were unable to discern the altitude of the guerrilla aircraft. Due to this and other factors that cannot be spelt out for obvious reasons, the guerrilla aircraft got away. This is despite a number of counter measures adopted after reports of Tiger guerrillas acquiring air capability. Though such a capability was regarded as very primitive, tougher and most sophisticated measures were put in place to counter them. This included air defence systems, surveillance radars and rapid reaction mechanisms.
Measures to deal with the shortcomings that have arisen have become the subject of close study at the highest levels of the SLAF. The matter was examined at discussions yesterday too. It has become clear to the authorities that the target of the guerrilla aircraft was the "Jetliner" which was in the Nicholson Cove. However, security authorities believe the guerrilla aircraft veered away to bomb the other locations after drawing fire from the ground. If the bombs did fall on this large passenger cum cargo transport vessel, there was a likelihood of greater damage being caused. If they succeeded, the guerrillas believed they would be able to disrupt the movement of troops from the north to the south and vice versa. Attacks on the Jetliner when it is at sea are difficult since the vessel is heavily guarded by naval craft as well as helicopter gunships during its voyage.
In the absence of visual contact, the security authorities are unable to say conclusively the number of aircraft used by the Tiger guerrillas. However, both the SLAF and the Navy have reason to believe there were two Czech-built Zlin - Z 143 light aircraft that were used. They say the bombs used were locally made and weighed 25 kilogrammes.
Lending further credence to reports that the guerrillas used two aircraft, as in all previous occasions, were photographs in the Tamilnet web site. They showed the guerrilla "pilots" wearing "wings" together with others who are suspected to be ground crew posing with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. See photograph on this page This is what Tamilnet had to say on the incident:
"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9.15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed. The aircraft safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said."
This is the sixth air attack carried out by Tiger guerrillas. It is the first such attack in 2008. All previous attacks were carried out last year. The first came on March 26, 2007 when they bombed the Air Force base at Katunayake. It left three airmen dead and 16 wounded. The second was on the Army Engineers Unit in the High Security Zone at the Security Forces Headquarters in Palaly on April 23, 2007. Six soldiers were killed and 13 wounded. A third abortive attempt was made to bomb the Air Force base at Katunayake on April 26, 2007. The fourth came when two guerrilla aircraft bombed the Shell Liquefied Petroleum Gas facility at Muthurajawela and the adjoining Ceylon Petroleum Corporation's storage facility. The fifth came when the guerrillas attacked the SLAF base in Anuradhapura on October 22 last year.
A sailor wounded in last Tuesday’s Tiger guerrilla air attack at the Trincomalee base Hospital.
Photo: Amadoru Amerasinghe
Despite the six different air raids, guerrilla aircraft are yet to be destroyed or damaged. This is the first time in 16 months (and for the first time this year), that the guerrillas carried out the air attack on the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Even if their air capability, which is no match for the conventional capability of the Air Force, remains intact, there are reasons for their debut this year.
The guerrillas have come under heavy military pressure particularly on the western part of the Wanni sector. Since seizing control of areas in and around the Madhu Church in April this year, troops have continued their thrust. They re-captured the Sea Tiger base in Vidattaltivu and continued their advance to seize more territory. Troops have re-captured a vast swathe of territory inwards from the coast just south of Nachchikuda where a major Sea Tiger base is located.
There were reports last week that the guerrillas were shifting logistics from this base, the last remaining facility used for smuggling military and medical supplies across the Gulf of Mannar from Tamil Nadu. As the troops are poised to move eastwards to seize more terrain, in the guerrilla-dominated districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, bitter battles loom large. The guerrillas have been making hurried preparations constructing defences and positioning cadres. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate any further.
In carrying out their sixth air attack, the guerrillas have again demonstrated their ability, with primitive air capability, to infiltrate highly-defended areas to take on military targets. That has enabled them to create some impact.
In the wake of these developments, a warning contained in an Air Force report after it was known that the guerrillas had acquired air capability (Situation Report - February 27 2005) is relevant. It warned, among other matters, that it could "be a precursor to using the air assets for offensive air operations against Government assets. This is either through the use of aircraft to drop bombs or fire at targets. They could also use an aircraft as a 'flying bomb.'
Despite all the sophisticated equipment and mechanisms in place, the guerrilla aircraft have continued to get away after air raids. Until a fool proof system is in place, there is little doubt that the threat of a "flying bomb" remains.
I CAN’T GO HOME
It must be noted that this dinner is being held in the High Security Zone in the centre of the country’s capital and such a venue in the current circumstances is not the right place. This poses possibilities of some ugly or even tragic incidents and one should wonder why the organizers have chosen such a risky place for the occasion. Or was this a choice of Father Jeyanesan and his friends such as Newton Gnanachandran, Chandran Ariaratnam, Shanthakumar, Selvarajah and others?
"Trapped into the WTM-LTTE den, the Canadian Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora is a community that is being exploited by clever crooks and downright desperados in the name of liberation for their people in Sri Lanka.
LTTE’s Air Raid on Trincomalee and Sri Lanka's Offensive Operations
I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards.”
(August 29, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The night raid by two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air wing on the Trincomalee naval base on August 26, 2008 may be termed as moderately successful. The two aircraft were similar to the ZLIN piston-engined ones that had raided Katunayake air base on March 27, 2007 and in the subsequent attacks on Palali air base on April 24, 2007 and the Anuradhapura air field on October 22, 2007. As in all the four air raids earlier they evaded both the ground fire and the chase by Sri Lanka air force fighters to return safely to their home base.
There had been discrepancies in the reports on the raid both in the number of casualties and on how the LTTE raid was conducted out. Broadly the raid went somewhat like this. Around 9 PM the LTTE aircraft flew in undetected and managed to sneak into the air space of the high security zone of the naval complex housing the Eastern Naval Headquarters and the Trincomalee dockyard. After dodging the anti aircraft gunfire when they were detected, one aircraft managed to drop two improvised bombs. Though the Eastern Naval Headquarters was not struck, at least four sailors were killed when one of the bombs struck a sailors’ billet. Ten to 20 persons (depending upon the source of the report) were reported injured.
It seems the intruding aircraft were detected a little late to engage them by fighters. Evading the anti aircraft fire the LTTE aircraft flew off after the strike on the sailors’ barracks. As in the earlier cases, one bomb did not explode. In retaliation the air force fighters took off to hunt the raiders but could not succeed in doing so. After that the air force bombed Iranamadu air strip and its assets.
Though the defence spokesman called it an abortive raid, it was not wholly so. The LTTE raiders succeeded at least partially in fulfilling their mission. And they managed to inflict casualty on the security forces while escaping unscathed. Two inquiries are being held apparently to find out how the LTTE planes managed to infiltrate through the air defence network without detection and carried out the raid.
Though the raid did not create the panic reaction among the public seen last year after the Katunayake raid, it will surely give a psychological lift up to the sagging morale of the LTTE’s support network both at home and abroad. So far they had to console themselves only with the rhetoric of the political commissar Nadesan on the impending LTTE response to the successful Sri Lankan offensive going on now for two years. The raid will also come as a shot in the arm for LTTE’s defenders in frontlines who had been having a tough time for the last few months as the offensive gathered momentum. A far as the Sri Lanka public is concerned they appear to be taking it in the stride as one of the necessary evils of pursuing the military option. Thus the LTTE air raids appear to have lost their public threat potential enhanced by the very audacity of their ability to carry out such a raid well away from the LTTE home grounds in Wanni.
Otherwise, the air raid would be classified as a small scale raid daringly carried out. But in comparison with the scale of the happenings in the battlefronts of the north, the air raid does not have the potential to cause significant impact on the ongoing operations. Except for tasking a special commando force to seek and destroy the LTTE’s secret hangars in Wanni as the operation progresses, no other special action would probably be taken at the battlefront. The LTTE operational planners probably know this limitation. The pressure on them must be mounting as the security forces advance had been causing exodus of civilians in thousands from battle zones. So they probably carried out the air raid for want of any other manageable operational task that could create some impact immediately.
At the same time, operationally the raid gives some interesting insights –
• The ability of the LTTE air wing to penetrate the airspace in high security zones remains undiminished, despite the counter measures taken so far. As discussed in my earlier articles on the subject, light aircraft with small radar signatures, flying below the horizon can escape early radar detection. This is more so if they follow a flight path hugging the coastline contours to escape early detection.
• To overcome this weakness the anti aircraft defence network should include integrated ground observer posts along likely air ingress routes. This is a very time tested civil defence method against air raids in vogue for over seventy years! However, to be successful it needs committed people with well rehearsed procedure for identification and reporting.
• On detection, the anti aircraft guns need to put maximum number of shots in the air in the fastest time to get a hit. In a night raid visual firing is fraught with serious limitations as the city lights in the horizon confuse the vision. This will again require a lot of practice firing.
• In the past also the fighters had never been able to chase and kill the raiding aircraft. This is not surprising. Rarely will the fighters be able to respond in time unless they are positioned in operational readiness platforms (ORP) on the runway at the airfield. The mute point is, do such occasional raids by light aircraft merit tedious ORP status involving expensive hi-tech fighters designed for not only air combat but also ground support operations in counter insurgency? Only the security chiefs can answer this question.
• It is surprising that despite the large number of modern surveillance and early warning devices available to monitor the intruding aircraft from take off to reaching target area, the LTTE pilots had always managed to prevent detection till the last moment when they gain height. Perhaps the security forces would do well to study the successful tactics of these “amateur fighter pilots” a little more seriously to eliminate the air threat.
• There has been high rate of failure of the improvised bombs of the LTTE. This would show the LTTE has not been able to refine both the aerodynamics of the bomb design and the use of appropriate fuses to reduce the strike failure rate.
I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards. Looking at the well planned operations so far, the security forces would have already catered for such a possibility in their contingency plans.
Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
[TamilNet, Wednesday, 27 August 2008, 19:52 GMT]
Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9:15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed.
The aircrafts safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said.
The Tigers issued photos of the Air Tiger fighters with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan.
LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]
LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]
Chronology:
27.08.08 Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
26.08.08 LTTE air strike on Trincomalee harbour - SLN
Related Articles:
28.04.07 Air Tigers attack 2 targets in Colombo - LTTE
24.04.07 Barrage of gunfire as Tiger aircrafts complete bombing raid,..
23.04.07 Tiger aircrafts bomb Palaali military base
26.03.07 LTTE releases photographs of air mission
25.03.07 Air-Tigers attack Katunayake military airbase
The grave story of the "ghost" aircraft
* LTTE air wing's first strike for 2008 causes deaths, damage and poses questions
* Main target missed but danger of flying bomb increases
Last Tuesday (August 26) was a cloudy night in eastern Sri Lanka. At a jetty in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, home for Sri Lanka Navy's eastern headquarters, there was hectic activity.
Troops were preparing to board the "Jetliner," the transport vessel acquired from an Indonesian company. It is capable of carrying some 3,000 passengers besides cargo. At dawn next day this vessel was to begin its voyage to Kankesanthurai (KKS)
Two of three bombs dropped by Tiger guerrilla aircraft last Tuesday night fell on the multi-storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa at the Navy’s Eastern Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Here is a section of the roof damaged by the bombing. One bomb that fell on the roof of a building nearby did not explode.
If maritime movements with logistics from Trincomalee to KKS serve as the umbilical cord for some 40,000 troops and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, the "Jetliner" plays a pivotal role. It is the main mode of transport for troops and police officers. They either take the seaward journey for deployment or when returning home on leave.
Amidst all activity that night, the Operations Room at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters received reports of what was suspected to be advancing Tiger guerrilla aircraft. It was just one minute to 9 p.m. This was after naval craft at sea observed echoes on their radar screens. Telephones of the various units at Dockyard went busy. Soon air defence gun positions directed fire into the night sky. So did navy patrol craft at sea. Even some troops deployed in the Trincomalee town area directed rifle fire into the night sky. Yet, none was able to observe the intruding aircraft. It was dark and raining.
Just then, loud explosions rendered the air. Bombs were falling. The first fell on the Civil Engineering Yard causing extensive damage to buildings. It is located opposite the CNAD or the Ceylon National Armoured Depot. The CNAD has been in existence from the time of the British who had their base at the Dockyard during World War II. Three others fell on the multi storied battalion mess of SLNS Tissa. Two bombs exploded and one that fell on a roof did not. Four sailors were killed on the spot. Thirty-five more were wounded, a large number sustaining minor injuries. Seven of those seriously injured were later airlifted to Colombo. In all, four bombs were dropped. Three had exploded and one remained intact.
Tamilnet picture shows LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran posing with “pilots” and staff of his “Air Wing” reportedly after last Tuesday’s air raid on Sri Lanka Navy’s Eastern Headquarters in Trincomalee.
Earlier that day, there had also been another unexpected tragedy. A sailor in a dinghy who went around placing depth charges in the seas around the Navy’s eastern headquarters area died when one of them exploded prematurely. These depth charges are timed to explode under water to prevent infiltration by guerrilla divers. The explosions trigger strong under water waves capable of causing devastating effects on intruders including the bursting of ear drums.
Independent of this development, the Navy had also alerted the Air Defence Control and Command Centre (ADC & C) located at the Air Force base in Katunayake. The guerrilla aircraft, they determined, had flown low from somewhere in Mullaitivu towards Trincomalee. (See map for suspected flight path). Reports said that the guerrilla aircraft was some 57 kilometres away from Trincomalee then. The SLAF base in Katunayake went into action following Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).
It was some 19 minutes later when two Chinese built F-7 interceptor jets equipped with air-to-air missiles scoured into the skies. They gave chase to the guerrilla aircraft. It was a case of the enemy aircraft being located too close. However, they had yet got away away. On the ground, Air Force personnel were tracking the movement of the returning guerrilla aircraft using 2-D radars. With this radar, they were unable to discern the altitude of the guerrilla aircraft. Due to this and other factors that cannot be spelt out for obvious reasons, the guerrilla aircraft got away. This is despite a number of counter measures adopted after reports of Tiger guerrillas acquiring air capability. Though such a capability was regarded as very primitive, tougher and most sophisticated measures were put in place to counter them. This included air defence systems, surveillance radars and rapid reaction mechanisms.
Measures to deal with the shortcomings that have arisen have become the subject of close study at the highest levels of the SLAF. The matter was examined at discussions yesterday too. It has become clear to the authorities that the target of the guerrilla aircraft was the "Jetliner" which was in the Nicholson Cove. However, security authorities believe the guerrilla aircraft veered away to bomb the other locations after drawing fire from the ground. If the bombs did fall on this large passenger cum cargo transport vessel, there was a likelihood of greater damage being caused. If they succeeded, the guerrillas believed they would be able to disrupt the movement of troops from the north to the south and vice versa. Attacks on the Jetliner when it is at sea are difficult since the vessel is heavily guarded by naval craft as well as helicopter gunships during its voyage.
In the absence of visual contact, the security authorities are unable to say conclusively the number of aircraft used by the Tiger guerrillas. However, both the SLAF and the Navy have reason to believe there were two Czech-built Zlin - Z 143 light aircraft that were used. They say the bombs used were locally made and weighed 25 kilogrammes.
Lending further credence to reports that the guerrillas used two aircraft, as in all previous occasions, were photographs in the Tamilnet web site. They showed the guerrilla "pilots" wearing "wings" together with others who are suspected to be ground crew posing with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. See photograph on this page This is what Tamilnet had to say on the incident:
"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9.15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed. The aircraft safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said."
This is the sixth air attack carried out by Tiger guerrillas. It is the first such attack in 2008. All previous attacks were carried out last year. The first came on March 26, 2007 when they bombed the Air Force base at Katunayake. It left three airmen dead and 16 wounded. The second was on the Army Engineers Unit in the High Security Zone at the Security Forces Headquarters in Palaly on April 23, 2007. Six soldiers were killed and 13 wounded. A third abortive attempt was made to bomb the Air Force base at Katunayake on April 26, 2007. The fourth came when two guerrilla aircraft bombed the Shell Liquefied Petroleum Gas facility at Muthurajawela and the adjoining Ceylon Petroleum Corporation's storage facility. The fifth came when the guerrillas attacked the SLAF base in Anuradhapura on October 22 last year.
A sailor wounded in last Tuesday’s Tiger guerrilla air attack at the Trincomalee base Hospital.
Photo: Amadoru Amerasinghe
Despite the six different air raids, guerrilla aircraft are yet to be destroyed or damaged. This is the first time in 16 months (and for the first time this year), that the guerrillas carried out the air attack on the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee. Even if their air capability, which is no match for the conventional capability of the Air Force, remains intact, there are reasons for their debut this year.
The guerrillas have come under heavy military pressure particularly on the western part of the Wanni sector. Since seizing control of areas in and around the Madhu Church in April this year, troops have continued their thrust. They re-captured the Sea Tiger base in Vidattaltivu and continued their advance to seize more territory. Troops have re-captured a vast swathe of territory inwards from the coast just south of Nachchikuda where a major Sea Tiger base is located.
There were reports last week that the guerrillas were shifting logistics from this base, the last remaining facility used for smuggling military and medical supplies across the Gulf of Mannar from Tamil Nadu. As the troops are poised to move eastwards to seize more terrain, in the guerrilla-dominated districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, bitter battles loom large. The guerrillas have been making hurried preparations constructing defences and positioning cadres. For obvious reasons one cannot elaborate any further.
In carrying out their sixth air attack, the guerrillas have again demonstrated their ability, with primitive air capability, to infiltrate highly-defended areas to take on military targets. That has enabled them to create some impact.
In the wake of these developments, a warning contained in an Air Force report after it was known that the guerrillas had acquired air capability (Situation Report - February 27 2005) is relevant. It warned, among other matters, that it could "be a precursor to using the air assets for offensive air operations against Government assets. This is either through the use of aircraft to drop bombs or fire at targets. They could also use an aircraft as a 'flying bomb.'
Despite all the sophisticated equipment and mechanisms in place, the guerrilla aircraft have continued to get away after air raids. Until a fool proof system is in place, there is little doubt that the threat of a "flying bomb" remains.
I CAN’T GO HOME
It must be noted that this dinner is being held in the High Security Zone in the centre of the country’s capital and such a venue in the current circumstances is not the right place. This poses possibilities of some ugly or even tragic incidents and one should wonder why the organizers have chosen such a risky place for the occasion. Or was this a choice of Father Jeyanesan and his friends such as Newton Gnanachandran, Chandran Ariaratnam, Shanthakumar, Selvarajah and others?
"Trapped into the WTM-LTTE den, the Canadian Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora is a community that is being exploited by clever crooks and downright desperados in the name of liberation for their people in Sri Lanka.
LTTE’s Air Raid on Trincomalee and Sri Lanka's Offensive Operations
I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards.”
(August 29, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The night raid by two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air wing on the Trincomalee naval base on August 26, 2008 may be termed as moderately successful. The two aircraft were similar to the ZLIN piston-engined ones that had raided Katunayake air base on March 27, 2007 and in the subsequent attacks on Palali air base on April 24, 2007 and the Anuradhapura air field on October 22, 2007. As in all the four air raids earlier they evaded both the ground fire and the chase by Sri Lanka air force fighters to return safely to their home base.
There had been discrepancies in the reports on the raid both in the number of casualties and on how the LTTE raid was conducted out. Broadly the raid went somewhat like this. Around 9 PM the LTTE aircraft flew in undetected and managed to sneak into the air space of the high security zone of the naval complex housing the Eastern Naval Headquarters and the Trincomalee dockyard. After dodging the anti aircraft gunfire when they were detected, one aircraft managed to drop two improvised bombs. Though the Eastern Naval Headquarters was not struck, at least four sailors were killed when one of the bombs struck a sailors’ billet. Ten to 20 persons (depending upon the source of the report) were reported injured.
It seems the intruding aircraft were detected a little late to engage them by fighters. Evading the anti aircraft fire the LTTE aircraft flew off after the strike on the sailors’ barracks. As in the earlier cases, one bomb did not explode. In retaliation the air force fighters took off to hunt the raiders but could not succeed in doing so. After that the air force bombed Iranamadu air strip and its assets.
Though the defence spokesman called it an abortive raid, it was not wholly so. The LTTE raiders succeeded at least partially in fulfilling their mission. And they managed to inflict casualty on the security forces while escaping unscathed. Two inquiries are being held apparently to find out how the LTTE planes managed to infiltrate through the air defence network without detection and carried out the raid.
Though the raid did not create the panic reaction among the public seen last year after the Katunayake raid, it will surely give a psychological lift up to the sagging morale of the LTTE’s support network both at home and abroad. So far they had to console themselves only with the rhetoric of the political commissar Nadesan on the impending LTTE response to the successful Sri Lankan offensive going on now for two years. The raid will also come as a shot in the arm for LTTE’s defenders in frontlines who had been having a tough time for the last few months as the offensive gathered momentum. A far as the Sri Lanka public is concerned they appear to be taking it in the stride as one of the necessary evils of pursuing the military option. Thus the LTTE air raids appear to have lost their public threat potential enhanced by the very audacity of their ability to carry out such a raid well away from the LTTE home grounds in Wanni.
Otherwise, the air raid would be classified as a small scale raid daringly carried out. But in comparison with the scale of the happenings in the battlefronts of the north, the air raid does not have the potential to cause significant impact on the ongoing operations. Except for tasking a special commando force to seek and destroy the LTTE’s secret hangars in Wanni as the operation progresses, no other special action would probably be taken at the battlefront. The LTTE operational planners probably know this limitation. The pressure on them must be mounting as the security forces advance had been causing exodus of civilians in thousands from battle zones. So they probably carried out the air raid for want of any other manageable operational task that could create some impact immediately.
At the same time, operationally the raid gives some interesting insights –
• The ability of the LTTE air wing to penetrate the airspace in high security zones remains undiminished, despite the counter measures taken so far. As discussed in my earlier articles on the subject, light aircraft with small radar signatures, flying below the horizon can escape early radar detection. This is more so if they follow a flight path hugging the coastline contours to escape early detection.
• To overcome this weakness the anti aircraft defence network should include integrated ground observer posts along likely air ingress routes. This is a very time tested civil defence method against air raids in vogue for over seventy years! However, to be successful it needs committed people with well rehearsed procedure for identification and reporting.
• On detection, the anti aircraft guns need to put maximum number of shots in the air in the fastest time to get a hit. In a night raid visual firing is fraught with serious limitations as the city lights in the horizon confuse the vision. This will again require a lot of practice firing.
• In the past also the fighters had never been able to chase and kill the raiding aircraft. This is not surprising. Rarely will the fighters be able to respond in time unless they are positioned in operational readiness platforms (ORP) on the runway at the airfield. The mute point is, do such occasional raids by light aircraft merit tedious ORP status involving expensive hi-tech fighters designed for not only air combat but also ground support operations in counter insurgency? Only the security chiefs can answer this question.
• It is surprising that despite the large number of modern surveillance and early warning devices available to monitor the intruding aircraft from take off to reaching target area, the LTTE pilots had always managed to prevent detection till the last moment when they gain height. Perhaps the security forces would do well to study the successful tactics of these “amateur fighter pilots” a little more seriously to eliminate the air threat.
• There has been high rate of failure of the improvised bombs of the LTTE. This would show the LTTE has not been able to refine both the aerodynamics of the bomb design and the use of appropriate fuses to reduce the strike failure rate.
I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards. Looking at the well planned operations so far, the security forces would have already catered for such a possibility in their contingency plans.
Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
[TamilNet, Wednesday, 27 August 2008, 19:52 GMT]
Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) on Wednesday claimed that the Air Tigers carried out a successful air strike on the Eastern Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Navy located in the inner harbour of Trincomalee Tuesday at 9:15 p.m. At least 4 SLN sailors were killed and more than 35 wounded in the air strike, which inflicted heavy damage on the SLN base, the Tigers claimed.
The aircrafts safely returned to their base after carrying out their mission, the LTTE said.
The Tigers issued photos of the Air Tiger fighters with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan.
LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]
LTTE air strike
[Photo: LTTE]
Chronology:
27.08.08 Airstrike targeted SLN Eastern HQ - LTTE
26.08.08 LTTE air strike on Trincomalee harbour - SLN
Related Articles:
28.04.07 Air Tigers attack 2 targets in Colombo - LTTE
24.04.07 Barrage of gunfire as Tiger aircrafts complete bombing raid,..
23.04.07 Tiger aircrafts bomb Palaali military base
26.03.07 LTTE releases photographs of air mission
25.03.07 Air-Tigers attack Katunayake military airbase
COLOMBO LIVES BY THE SWORD AND DIES BY THE SWORD. PETTAH BOMBED BY UNKNOWN EXTREMIST.
47 Wounded in Bomb Blast In Colombo
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/08/blast-in-colombo.html
Names of those injured in Pettah blast updated
(August 30, Colombo.
href="http://http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/08/blast-in-colombo.html">
The bomb which went off in Pettah injuring at least 47 persons was believed to planted close to a Clocks stall , near the Bo tree at Olcott Mawatha, Police said. The explosion went off at 12.15 p.m. and the area was crowded at the time of the blast .
The condition of five persons are reported to be serious.
"We received 45 people injured in the blast," a director of the Colombo National Hospital, Anil Jasinghe, told Sri Lanka Guardian.
"There are four women and two children among the wounded," he said.
Some roads adjoining Olcott Mawatha in Pettah have been closed temporary following the explosion. Police said that investigations are going on into the incident.
The names of 35 persons out of 47 who were injured at the Pettah bomb blast this morning have been released. The names are as follows:
1. Gamini, age 26, Kurunegala
2. Ranjith Nalaka, age 28, Chilaw
3. A.M. Ajith Bandara, age 22, Lunugama
4. Anoma Chandani, age 23, Biyagama
5. Susiri Udayanga, age 24, Mattegoda
6. M.A.M.Roshen, age 36, Veyangoda
7. M. Chandra Malkanthi, age 48, Urugasmanghandiya
8. H.M. Nandasena, age 51, Maha Buthgamuwa, Angoda
9. L.A.D.K. Thilak Krishantha, age 21, Lunugama
10. Kasun Laksiri, age 10, Gampola
11. Pradeepa Bandara, age 21, Gampola
12. Isuru Dinesh Kumara, age 20, Kosgama
13. M. Saleem Rizwan, age 38, Colombo 12
14. K. Rajaratnam, age 32 , Colombo
15. P.P. Indrage, age 42, Tissamaharama
16. Chethana Kumari, age 21, Mulleriyawa
17. D.M.Rampriya, age 45, Kotikawatte
18. T.M. Ibrahim, age 45, Colombo 15
19. P.H.D. Jagath, 26, Muthiangama
20. Shashika Methmal, age 28, Kurunegala
21. Dulip Bodhisinghe, age 42, Bambalapitiya
22. Ajith Viranga, age 39, Weliweriya
23. W.B. Prasanna Karunatilake, age 37, Gunasinghapura
24. H.D. Soysa, age 69, Rajagiriya
25. A.D. Ruwan, age 70, Wattala
26. Nimal Chandrasiri, age 48, Ganemulla
27. Nilupa Kumara, age 32, Gunesinghepura
28. M. Rajan, age 27, Narammala
29. Rukmal Sampath Godahewage, age 32, Kegalle
30. P.C. Chinthaka , age 29, Weligama
31. D.M Chandrapala, age 25, Ampara
32. M. Jayakody, age 43, Athurugiriya
33. W.D. Ranjith, age 42, Angunuppalassa
34. C.P.Cooray, age 60, Hanwella
35. Preethika Hettiarachchi , age 26, Biyagama
Bomb blast in Sri Lanka capital wounds nearly 50
by Amal Jayasinghe Sat Aug 30, 8:08 AM ET
COLOMBO (AFP) - Suspected Tamil Tiger guerrillas detonated a bomb in Colombo's commercial hub on Saturday wounding nearly 50 people, officials said, as government forces kept up a major drive against the rebels.
The bomb was concealed under a red satin-covered roadside stall displaying fake designer watches in the busy Pettah area of the capital, a short distance from the main bus station and the railway terminal.
"We received 48 people injured in the blast," said Anil Jasinghe, a director of the Colombo National Hospital.
"There are seven women and two children among the wounded," Jasinghe said, describing most of the injuries as "light to moderate." Most were leg wounds.
"There were fewer people today because of the rains from the morning," a shopkeeper said. "We heard the sound of a blast, but we thought it was a firecracker. It didn't sound like a huge bomb."
The explosion was minor compared to a bomb explosion also blamed on the rebels that occured in April 1987 in the same area, killing 111 people and wounding over 750 wounded.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack but President Mahinda Rajapakse's office said the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas were believed to have carried out the bombing.
"Several recent plots by the LTTE to carry out bomb attacks targeting government installations, public transport and civilians have been foiled following information of such terrorist plots being revealed by LTTE cadres who were arrested by the police," the president's office said in a statement.
The defence ministry said security was further stepped up in the area following the blast.
Police cordoned off the bustling Pettah commercial area after the attack, which came as government forces continued to pound Tamil Tiger targets in the north of the island.
The Tigers have also been blamed for a string of bomb attacks against public transport and other blasts in recent months as the military intensified pressure on the rebels' defacto mini-state in the north.
The attack came as the defence ministry said another 18 guerrillas and a government soldier were killed in fresh fighting on Friday.
The latest fighting brought the number of rebels killed by troops since January to 6,185, according to government figures. The government says 582 of its soldiers have died in the same period.
Saturday's attack came a day after the rebels accused government forces of setting off a roadside bomb and killing two civilians inside guerrilla-held territory.
A man and a child died when their motorcycle was caught up in the bomb attack at Nedunkerni in the vast Wanni region on Thursday evening, the LTTE said in a statement.
The military routinely denies it carries out attacks against civilians inside Tamil Tiger-controlled areas.
It is impossible to verify independently casualty figures as the government bars access to the front-lines by journalists and rights groups.
UN aid agencies say nearly 135,000 people have been driven from their homes due to fierce fighting in the past two months.
Sri Lankan troops have been pushing deeper into rebel-held territory as they try to dismantle the LTTE's northern stronghold. They ejected the guerrillas from the east of the island in July 2007.
Tens of thousands of people have died on both sides since the LTTE launched a separatist campaign in 1972 for a homeland for minority Tamils in the island's north and east.
http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Sri-Lanka-Unrest-Sri-Lankan-army-officer-Colombo2C-
Sri-Lanka-Sri-Lanka-three-soldiers/ss/events/wl/042506srilankabomber/s:/ap/20080830/
ap_on_re_as/sri_lanka_3/im:/080830/481/444b724a1279457b801c44d70cf6edf1/;_ylt=
An7ryUPfig79Ezx2
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26783
"http://http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26783">
SLA shelling kills 5 IDPs, children in Ki'inochchi
Saturday, 30 August 2008, 12:15 GMT]
Five civilians, including two children, displaced recently from Mannaar district were killed Saturday evening when Sri Lanka Army (SLA) launched artillery attack on Puthumu'rippu village, situated a few kilometers from Ki'inochchi town. Three civilians were rushed to Ki'inochchi hospital in critical condition, according to medical sources. The SLA attack, targeting the village, densely populated by IDPs, comes a day after Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) dropped leaflets threatening heavy casualties to civilians in Vanni unless they moved from LTTE administered Vanni.
The artillery attack has taken place at 4:40 p.m.
The civilians killed were identified as 28-year-old Karuppiah Anantharajah, his 2-year-old son Anantharajah Gowtham, 27-year-old Thilakeshvari Visvanthan with her 1-month-old baby and 28-year-old Alagesan Luka Pathmalatha.
The wounded were 17-year-old female Rajeswary Balasubramaniyam, 10-month-old baby Iyalvili Alageswaran and another female in unconscious state, yet to be identified, according to medical sources.
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
2-year-old Anantharasa Gowtham was killed with his father
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
A child killed on the spot in SLA artillery attack
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
Civilians killed in SLA barrage on IDPs in Vanni
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
A victim being treated at Ki'linochchi hospital
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/08/blast-in-colombo.html
Names of those injured in Pettah blast updated
(August 30, Colombo.
href="http://http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2008/08/blast-in-colombo.html">
The bomb which went off in Pettah injuring at least 47 persons was believed to planted close to a Clocks stall , near the Bo tree at Olcott Mawatha, Police said. The explosion went off at 12.15 p.m. and the area was crowded at the time of the blast .
The condition of five persons are reported to be serious.
"We received 45 people injured in the blast," a director of the Colombo National Hospital, Anil Jasinghe, told Sri Lanka Guardian.
"There are four women and two children among the wounded," he said.
Some roads adjoining Olcott Mawatha in Pettah have been closed temporary following the explosion. Police said that investigations are going on into the incident.
The names of 35 persons out of 47 who were injured at the Pettah bomb blast this morning have been released. The names are as follows:
1. Gamini, age 26, Kurunegala
2. Ranjith Nalaka, age 28, Chilaw
3. A.M. Ajith Bandara, age 22, Lunugama
4. Anoma Chandani, age 23, Biyagama
5. Susiri Udayanga, age 24, Mattegoda
6. M.A.M.Roshen, age 36, Veyangoda
7. M. Chandra Malkanthi, age 48, Urugasmanghandiya
8. H.M. Nandasena, age 51, Maha Buthgamuwa, Angoda
9. L.A.D.K. Thilak Krishantha, age 21, Lunugama
10. Kasun Laksiri, age 10, Gampola
11. Pradeepa Bandara, age 21, Gampola
12. Isuru Dinesh Kumara, age 20, Kosgama
13. M. Saleem Rizwan, age 38, Colombo 12
14. K. Rajaratnam, age 32 , Colombo
15. P.P. Indrage, age 42, Tissamaharama
16. Chethana Kumari, age 21, Mulleriyawa
17. D.M.Rampriya, age 45, Kotikawatte
18. T.M. Ibrahim, age 45, Colombo 15
19. P.H.D. Jagath, 26, Muthiangama
20. Shashika Methmal, age 28, Kurunegala
21. Dulip Bodhisinghe, age 42, Bambalapitiya
22. Ajith Viranga, age 39, Weliweriya
23. W.B. Prasanna Karunatilake, age 37, Gunasinghapura
24. H.D. Soysa, age 69, Rajagiriya
25. A.D. Ruwan, age 70, Wattala
26. Nimal Chandrasiri, age 48, Ganemulla
27. Nilupa Kumara, age 32, Gunesinghepura
28. M. Rajan, age 27, Narammala
29. Rukmal Sampath Godahewage, age 32, Kegalle
30. P.C. Chinthaka , age 29, Weligama
31. D.M Chandrapala, age 25, Ampara
32. M. Jayakody, age 43, Athurugiriya
33. W.D. Ranjith, age 42, Angunuppalassa
34. C.P.Cooray, age 60, Hanwella
35. Preethika Hettiarachchi , age 26, Biyagama
Bomb blast in Sri Lanka capital wounds nearly 50
by Amal Jayasinghe Sat Aug 30, 8:08 AM ET
COLOMBO (AFP) - Suspected Tamil Tiger guerrillas detonated a bomb in Colombo's commercial hub on Saturday wounding nearly 50 people, officials said, as government forces kept up a major drive against the rebels.
The bomb was concealed under a red satin-covered roadside stall displaying fake designer watches in the busy Pettah area of the capital, a short distance from the main bus station and the railway terminal.
"We received 48 people injured in the blast," said Anil Jasinghe, a director of the Colombo National Hospital.
"There are seven women and two children among the wounded," Jasinghe said, describing most of the injuries as "light to moderate." Most were leg wounds.
"There were fewer people today because of the rains from the morning," a shopkeeper said. "We heard the sound of a blast, but we thought it was a firecracker. It didn't sound like a huge bomb."
The explosion was minor compared to a bomb explosion also blamed on the rebels that occured in April 1987 in the same area, killing 111 people and wounding over 750 wounded.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack but President Mahinda Rajapakse's office said the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas were believed to have carried out the bombing.
"Several recent plots by the LTTE to carry out bomb attacks targeting government installations, public transport and civilians have been foiled following information of such terrorist plots being revealed by LTTE cadres who were arrested by the police," the president's office said in a statement.
The defence ministry said security was further stepped up in the area following the blast.
Police cordoned off the bustling Pettah commercial area after the attack, which came as government forces continued to pound Tamil Tiger targets in the north of the island.
The Tigers have also been blamed for a string of bomb attacks against public transport and other blasts in recent months as the military intensified pressure on the rebels' defacto mini-state in the north.
The attack came as the defence ministry said another 18 guerrillas and a government soldier were killed in fresh fighting on Friday.
The latest fighting brought the number of rebels killed by troops since January to 6,185, according to government figures. The government says 582 of its soldiers have died in the same period.
Saturday's attack came a day after the rebels accused government forces of setting off a roadside bomb and killing two civilians inside guerrilla-held territory.
A man and a child died when their motorcycle was caught up in the bomb attack at Nedunkerni in the vast Wanni region on Thursday evening, the LTTE said in a statement.
The military routinely denies it carries out attacks against civilians inside Tamil Tiger-controlled areas.
It is impossible to verify independently casualty figures as the government bars access to the front-lines by journalists and rights groups.
UN aid agencies say nearly 135,000 people have been driven from their homes due to fierce fighting in the past two months.
Sri Lankan troops have been pushing deeper into rebel-held territory as they try to dismantle the LTTE's northern stronghold. They ejected the guerrillas from the east of the island in July 2007.
Tens of thousands of people have died on both sides since the LTTE launched a separatist campaign in 1972 for a homeland for minority Tamils in the island's north and east.
http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Sri-Lanka-Unrest-Sri-Lankan-army-officer-Colombo2C-
Sri-Lanka-Sri-Lanka-three-soldiers/ss/events/wl/042506srilankabomber/s:/ap/20080830/
ap_on_re_as/sri_lanka_3/im:/080830/481/444b724a1279457b801c44d70cf6edf1/;_ylt=
An7ryUPfig79Ezx2
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26783
"http://http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26783">
SLA shelling kills 5 IDPs, children in Ki'inochchi
Saturday, 30 August 2008, 12:15 GMT]
Five civilians, including two children, displaced recently from Mannaar district were killed Saturday evening when Sri Lanka Army (SLA) launched artillery attack on Puthumu'rippu village, situated a few kilometers from Ki'inochchi town. Three civilians were rushed to Ki'inochchi hospital in critical condition, according to medical sources. The SLA attack, targeting the village, densely populated by IDPs, comes a day after Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) dropped leaflets threatening heavy casualties to civilians in Vanni unless they moved from LTTE administered Vanni.
The artillery attack has taken place at 4:40 p.m.
The civilians killed were identified as 28-year-old Karuppiah Anantharajah, his 2-year-old son Anantharajah Gowtham, 27-year-old Thilakeshvari Visvanthan with her 1-month-old baby and 28-year-old Alagesan Luka Pathmalatha.
The wounded were 17-year-old female Rajeswary Balasubramaniyam, 10-month-old baby Iyalvili Alageswaran and another female in unconscious state, yet to be identified, according to medical sources.
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
2-year-old Anantharasa Gowtham was killed with his father
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
A child killed on the spot in SLA artillery attack
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
Civilians killed in SLA barrage on IDPs in Vanni
SLA artillery attack on Vanni
A victim being treated at Ki'linochchi hospital
Iran’s financial strength is nothing else but oil:
Iran’s secret weapon isn’t bombs but oil
by David Blair
When oil prices are high, the world’s anti-western regimes can afford to rub their hands with glee. Like a global whirlwind, the price of crude scoops up the pattern of wealth and power between nations and throws it back to earth in a wholly different order.
Russia’s oil-fired belligerence is now plain for all to see. Less noted is the crucial link between expensive oil and Iran’s stance on its nuclear programme.
When it comes to being singled out for United Nations sanctions, no country can compete with Iran. So far, the Islamic republic has been the target of three resolutions squeezing its economy, and the Security Council will probably consider a fourth in October.
Yet president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime remains stubbornly resilient in the face of this mounting pressure. America and the European Union have imposed their own financial countermeasures, far more serious than the UN’s penalties and designed to isolate Iran from the world banking system and paralyse its entire economy.
With every passing day, doing business in Tehran becomes steadily more difficult and costly - but Ahmadinejad’s government remains devoted to its nuclear programme and, in particular, to the vital process of enriching uranium which could be used to make the essential material for a nuclear weapon.
To grasp why Tehran feels confident enough to shrug off the sanctions and press on with its nuclear-tipped ambitions, you need only understand a handful of crucial figures. At present, oil trades at around $115 per barrel, a fall of over 20 per cent in the last two months.
Yet Iran’s national budget for 2008 presumed an oil price of only $40 per barrel. As the proud possessor of 130?billion barrels of proven reserves - more than anywhere else in the world except Saudi Arabia - Iran can produce about 4.2?million barrels of crude every day.
Hence the oil price is the crucial determinant of how much cash the regime has at its fingertips. With a display of prudence that Gordon Brown in his heyday as chancellor would have admired, Iran’s financial boffins read the runes for 2008 and chose a deliberately pessimistic forecast of the possible course of oil prices.
As a result, Ahmadinejad’s government is awash with money. Exactly how much surplus cash he has in the kitty is hard to calculate, but in February this year, Iran’s foreign exchange reserves were thought to total about $60?billion.
This piled up during the course of last year, given the earlier prudence of Iran’s finance ministry. The national budget for 2007 assumed an oil price of only $34 per barrel. In fact, crude sold for an average of $72 throughout that year.
Thanks to this combination of good fortune and prudent management, Iran’s regime now has a giant cushion against the full impact of international sanctions and a sense of security which outsiders may find hard to comprehend.
The central fact is that oil prices would have to fall by another $75 in order to reach the level presumed by Iran’s financial bureaucrats. The price would have to go still lower, below $40 a barrel, for Tehran’s national coffers seriously to feel the pinch - the chances of this happening are extremely low.
The prudence of Iran’s officials might have given Ahmadinejad his surplus, but the president and his cronies have leapt on the chance to blow the windfall. Tehran is criss-crossed by new highways and a glittering international airport has appeared in the desert outside the capital.
The Revolutionary Guards Corps, forming the largest component of Iran’s armed forces, has grabbed its share by acquiring a wide array of commercial interests.
With the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Guards now run everything from airports to factories and oil and gas pipelines. Their commanders have become rich men and their alliance with Khamenei is a crucial factor in Iranian politics.
But ordinary people have seen precious little benefit from the oil boom. Instead, Ahmadinejad’s wasteful spending has driven up inflation, which now runs at about 35 per cent, and damaged the living standards of millions.
Rents in Tehran have rocketed, an especially painful development in a country where two thirds of the population are under 30 and countless young couples want to set up home together.
Moreover, the imposition of financial sanctions limits the use that Iran can make of its oil windfall. The world’s biggest banks will not handle cash from Iran, rendering it extremely difficult to hold the proceeds of oil exports in major world currencies.
Most European and Japanese banks have joined their American counterparts and stopped accepting deposits from Iranian clients, whether individuals or companies.
Increasingly, Iran has been forced to keep its oil money in its own currency, safely secreted in its own central bank. As western financial centres pull down the shutters, Dubai has become the new focus of Tehran’s currency dealings.
Despite the US embargo, some businesses in Iran will still take American Express or Visa credit cards. But the sum will be deducted in dirhams, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, and your bill will probably show that your cash has gone to a mysterious clothes shop in Dubai.
Yet despite everything, Iran’s national coffers are still overflowing - and this would surely give any government a sense of security.
If the nuclear confrontation is ever to be settled, numerous conditions would have to be met. Iran may want guarantees against attack by any outside power and proof of the bona fides of any western concessions.
But the oil price would also have to fall, perhaps below the magic figure embraced by Iran’s bureaucrats of $40 per barrel.
Unless this happens, the prospect of Iran compromising on its nuclear programme seems about as likely as any other hopeful event in the Middle East.
(C) The Telegraph Group London 2008
by David Blair
When oil prices are high, the world’s anti-western regimes can afford to rub their hands with glee. Like a global whirlwind, the price of crude scoops up the pattern of wealth and power between nations and throws it back to earth in a wholly different order.
Russia’s oil-fired belligerence is now plain for all to see. Less noted is the crucial link between expensive oil and Iran’s stance on its nuclear programme.
When it comes to being singled out for United Nations sanctions, no country can compete with Iran. So far, the Islamic republic has been the target of three resolutions squeezing its economy, and the Security Council will probably consider a fourth in October.
Yet president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime remains stubbornly resilient in the face of this mounting pressure. America and the European Union have imposed their own financial countermeasures, far more serious than the UN’s penalties and designed to isolate Iran from the world banking system and paralyse its entire economy.
With every passing day, doing business in Tehran becomes steadily more difficult and costly - but Ahmadinejad’s government remains devoted to its nuclear programme and, in particular, to the vital process of enriching uranium which could be used to make the essential material for a nuclear weapon.
To grasp why Tehran feels confident enough to shrug off the sanctions and press on with its nuclear-tipped ambitions, you need only understand a handful of crucial figures. At present, oil trades at around $115 per barrel, a fall of over 20 per cent in the last two months.
Yet Iran’s national budget for 2008 presumed an oil price of only $40 per barrel. As the proud possessor of 130?billion barrels of proven reserves - more than anywhere else in the world except Saudi Arabia - Iran can produce about 4.2?million barrels of crude every day.
Hence the oil price is the crucial determinant of how much cash the regime has at its fingertips. With a display of prudence that Gordon Brown in his heyday as chancellor would have admired, Iran’s financial boffins read the runes for 2008 and chose a deliberately pessimistic forecast of the possible course of oil prices.
As a result, Ahmadinejad’s government is awash with money. Exactly how much surplus cash he has in the kitty is hard to calculate, but in February this year, Iran’s foreign exchange reserves were thought to total about $60?billion.
This piled up during the course of last year, given the earlier prudence of Iran’s finance ministry. The national budget for 2007 assumed an oil price of only $34 per barrel. In fact, crude sold for an average of $72 throughout that year.
Thanks to this combination of good fortune and prudent management, Iran’s regime now has a giant cushion against the full impact of international sanctions and a sense of security which outsiders may find hard to comprehend.
The central fact is that oil prices would have to fall by another $75 in order to reach the level presumed by Iran’s financial bureaucrats. The price would have to go still lower, below $40 a barrel, for Tehran’s national coffers seriously to feel the pinch - the chances of this happening are extremely low.
The prudence of Iran’s officials might have given Ahmadinejad his surplus, but the president and his cronies have leapt on the chance to blow the windfall. Tehran is criss-crossed by new highways and a glittering international airport has appeared in the desert outside the capital.
The Revolutionary Guards Corps, forming the largest component of Iran’s armed forces, has grabbed its share by acquiring a wide array of commercial interests.
With the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Guards now run everything from airports to factories and oil and gas pipelines. Their commanders have become rich men and their alliance with Khamenei is a crucial factor in Iranian politics.
But ordinary people have seen precious little benefit from the oil boom. Instead, Ahmadinejad’s wasteful spending has driven up inflation, which now runs at about 35 per cent, and damaged the living standards of millions.
Rents in Tehran have rocketed, an especially painful development in a country where two thirds of the population are under 30 and countless young couples want to set up home together.
Moreover, the imposition of financial sanctions limits the use that Iran can make of its oil windfall. The world’s biggest banks will not handle cash from Iran, rendering it extremely difficult to hold the proceeds of oil exports in major world currencies.
Most European and Japanese banks have joined their American counterparts and stopped accepting deposits from Iranian clients, whether individuals or companies.
Increasingly, Iran has been forced to keep its oil money in its own currency, safely secreted in its own central bank. As western financial centres pull down the shutters, Dubai has become the new focus of Tehran’s currency dealings.
Despite the US embargo, some businesses in Iran will still take American Express or Visa credit cards. But the sum will be deducted in dirhams, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, and your bill will probably show that your cash has gone to a mysterious clothes shop in Dubai.
Yet despite everything, Iran’s national coffers are still overflowing - and this would surely give any government a sense of security.
If the nuclear confrontation is ever to be settled, numerous conditions would have to be met. Iran may want guarantees against attack by any outside power and proof of the bona fides of any western concessions.
But the oil price would also have to fall, perhaps below the magic figure embraced by Iran’s bureaucrats of $40 per barrel.
Unless this happens, the prospect of Iran compromising on its nuclear programme seems about as likely as any other hopeful event in the Middle East.
(C) The Telegraph Group London 2008
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Sri Lankan Airlines appoints its first female Captain
Feminine Touch
28 Aug, 2008 18:30:48
Sri Lankan Airlines appoints its first female Captain
Aug 28, 2008 (LBO) - Sri Lankan Airlines has appointed a female pilot, Anusha Siriratne, as Captain of an aircraft for the first time, the national carrier said in a statement.
To receive instant alerts from LBO on your Dialog mobile type 'lbo' and send to 678
"It doesn't make a difference whether you are a man or a woman when flying," the statement quoted Siriratne as saying.
"The circumstances don't change, the weather is the same, and the aircraft doesn't know the difference!"
Siriratne said women have lagged behind in the field of aviation in Sri Lanka, in comparison to the rest of the world.
"Even in neighbouring countries such as India, women have been airline Captains for many years now," she said.
Her husband Hemantha is also a pilot in Sri Lankan and received his Captain's appointment earlier this year.
They are the first husband-wife pilot duo in the country, the statement said.
Druvi Perera, Acting Senior Manager Flight Operations of the airline, said it now has several more female First Officers in the fleet, and hope to see them in command in a few years.
Sri Lankan has several female managers in senior positions in most of its nine divisions.
It also has women in areas that have traditionally been dominated by men such as aircraft engineering, the airline said.
Siriratne said that commanding an airliner has been a long-standing ambition.
She took a year off from flying when her daughter Anika, now five, was born.
Siriratne joined SriLankan as a Cadet Pilot in June 1998 and served as a Second Officer on the Lockheed L1011 Tristar fleet.
In 1999 she was promoted to First Officer when the airline was phasing out its aging Tristars with the advent of the all-Airbus fleet.
She became a First Officer on the A320's, A330's and A340's, flying to cities throughout SriLankan's network of destinations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
She obtained her Private Pilot's License at the local flying training school, CDE Aviation, and her Commercial Pilot's License in Texas.
Before joining Sri Lankan, she had a short stint as an Instructor at Sky Cabs, another domestic airline.
END:
Flying Tigers to follow soon?
28 Aug, 2008 18:30:48
Sri Lankan Airlines appoints its first female Captain
Aug 28, 2008 (LBO) - Sri Lankan Airlines has appointed a female pilot, Anusha Siriratne, as Captain of an aircraft for the first time, the national carrier said in a statement.
To receive instant alerts from LBO on your Dialog mobile type 'lbo' and send to 678
"It doesn't make a difference whether you are a man or a woman when flying," the statement quoted Siriratne as saying.
"The circumstances don't change, the weather is the same, and the aircraft doesn't know the difference!"
Siriratne said women have lagged behind in the field of aviation in Sri Lanka, in comparison to the rest of the world.
"Even in neighbouring countries such as India, women have been airline Captains for many years now," she said.
Her husband Hemantha is also a pilot in Sri Lankan and received his Captain's appointment earlier this year.
They are the first husband-wife pilot duo in the country, the statement said.
Druvi Perera, Acting Senior Manager Flight Operations of the airline, said it now has several more female First Officers in the fleet, and hope to see them in command in a few years.
Sri Lankan has several female managers in senior positions in most of its nine divisions.
It also has women in areas that have traditionally been dominated by men such as aircraft engineering, the airline said.
Siriratne said that commanding an airliner has been a long-standing ambition.
She took a year off from flying when her daughter Anika, now five, was born.
Siriratne joined SriLankan as a Cadet Pilot in June 1998 and served as a Second Officer on the Lockheed L1011 Tristar fleet.
In 1999 she was promoted to First Officer when the airline was phasing out its aging Tristars with the advent of the all-Airbus fleet.
She became a First Officer on the A320's, A330's and A340's, flying to cities throughout SriLankan's network of destinations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
She obtained her Private Pilot's License at the local flying training school, CDE Aviation, and her Commercial Pilot's License in Texas.
Before joining Sri Lankan, she had a short stint as an Instructor at Sky Cabs, another domestic airline.
END:
Flying Tigers to follow soon?
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
WALL STREET JOURNAL WRITES NONSENSE AGAIN. NO WONDER THE STOCK MARKET IS IN SUCH A MESS. WITH THE FRAUD IN THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
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The Sri Lankan Solution
August 28, 2008
Sri Lanka's military is now two months into a full-on offensive against the Tamil Tiger rebels in their northern base. An end finally may be in sight to the war that has roiled the country for a quarter century.
The government claims control of large areas in the region and could soon take the Tiger "capital" at Kilinochchi, an important symbolic victory. The operation, which has made surprisingly fast progress, could be over within six months to a year. But winning the conventional war is only a start to winning the peace.
Colombo is following the pattern it set in 2006 in the eastern provinces: launch a major offensive against Tamil fighters, then establish a democratic government. Two eastern elections this year were marred by some violence and charges of voter intimidation, but the peace seems to be holding.
The Tigers, a guerrilla fighting force par excellence, won't be easy to subdue. Despite the government's latest progress, there's speculation the Tigers have been holding back their best fighters up to now. Even if the government wins, enough remaining Tigers are likely to fade into the jungle to carry on a guerrilla campaign. The 25-year-old conflict has already claimed more than 100,000 lives, according to the International Crisis Group.
So as the military operation continues, Colombo needs to offer moderate Tamils a political settlement to separate them from the rebels. The government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has long promised to put greater power in the hands of local Tamil politicians in the east and north. So far it hasn't. The newly elected local and provincial councils in the east have little power to set economic policies in their areas, for example. The government has stalled on any proposal to vest more authority with local governments.
To break the cycle, the government needs to allow the All-Party Representative Committee, a body charged with negotiating a comprehensive devolution plan, to push forward toward an agreement. Colombo could also show good faith by reinstating the independent Constitutional Council that's supposed to oversee important institutions like the Human Rights Commission and the National Police Commission. Both steps would signal to moderate Tamils the government's seriousness about a political compromise between the ethnic Tamil minority and the majority Sinhalese.
Part of the problem is that President Rajapakse lacks the political will to follow through. He rode to power in 2005 on appeals to Sinhalese nationalism. The military solution plays well at the polls, and his coalition won big victories over the weekend in two provincial elections billed as referendums on the government. The political follow-up is more controversial.
Taking the battle to the Tigers in the north is an important step in ending the war. But lasting peace will be built on a political deal with the moderate Tamils left behind when the rebels are gone.
THE REAL FACTS AND TRUTH ON : Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka:
Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka:
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| 15 August 2007 | International Educational Development to the Security Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict |
| 11 May 2007 | Statement by the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on the LTTE |
| 11 May 2007 | Statement by the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on the 'Karuna'Group |
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| 8 February 2007 | Report by Allan Rock Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, |
| 5 February 2007 | Statement by UN Special Representative for children and armed conflict |
| 24 January 2007 | Human Rights Watch Report “Complicit in Crime: State Collusion in Abductions and Child Recruitment by the Karuna Group,” [also see http://hrw.org/reports/2007/srilanka0107/ ] |
| 6 February 2007 | International Federation of Tamils - Observations on the Report of Under Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka”
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| 20 Dec 2006 | Report of UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka S/2006/1006, together with comments by tamilnation.org |
| 12 December 06 | LTTE attack on school is a grave violation of rights of children |
| 7 December 06 | Karuna commits to work with the UN to prevent recruitment and use of children |
| 13 November 06 | Statement by Allan Rock, Special Advisor to the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict on Sri Lanka, |
| 9 November 06 | UN Condemns indiscriminate use of force |
| 1 December 2006 | Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation of children affected by armed conflict in Sri Lanka |
| 25 October 2006 | Tamil Eelam Child Protection Act |
| 10 August 2006 | Children and armed conflict in the Northeast of Sri Lanka - Report by the Child Protection Authority, LTTE Peace Secretariat - Executive Summary - Press Release |
| 29 July 2006 | Child Soldiers - Discussion in Tamil National Forum re IFT letter to UNICEF |
| 18 July 2006 | Kasturi Ranga Iyengar Family owned Owned Frontline on LTTE vs UNICEF
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| 17 July 2006 | Secretary General, International Federation of Tamils writes Ms. Ann M. Veneman, Executive Director, UNICEF
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| 19 July 2006 | Child Soldiers - Discussion in Tamil National Forum
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| 3 July 2006 | Child Rights Convention, Optional Protocol, Child Soldiers and the LTTE - LTTE Peace Secretariat"Understanding and applying the Child Rights standards in the Northeast under the LTTE de-facto government has become a confused affair due to several inherent contradictions surrounding the issue. Three major contradictions surrounding the issue are explained below. The following two important facts about the United Nations child rights instruments are unknown to many people energetically working on the issue of child solders. |
| 28 June 2006 | Grow Up, UNICEF: Playing political football with child soldiers - J.T. Janani, Tamil Guardian,
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| 1 July 2006 | UNICEF and child soldiers: List of Errors - LTTE Peace Secretariat
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| 28 June 2006 | UNICEF meets LTTE Child Protection Authority |
| 27 June 2006 | UN Special Representative for Children Affected by Armed Conflict announces a high level visit to Sri Lanka |
| 26 June 2006 | 46 under-age youth released by LTTE |
| 22 June 2006 | UNICEF condemns abduction and recruitment of Sri Lankan children by the Karuna group |
| 12 March 2006 | UNICEF and Underage Recruitment, Jayantha Gnanakone
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| 29 May 2005 | UNICEF says underage recruitment "very low"
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| 1 April 2005 | Tamil children orphaned by Sri Lanka’s war and tsunami - and maligned by UNICEF! - Editorial, Oru Paper
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| 5 March 2005 | UNICEF has Erred - S.P. Thamilchelvan, Political Wing, LTTE"The question of child soldiers continues to vex strained relations between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers. That the matter has been raised against the Tigers by the UN and other rights organizations is considered by Colombo as a feather in its foreign policy cap. |
| 14 January 2005 | LTTE denies UNICEF ‘child recruitment’ charge
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| 1 November 2004 | Human Rights Watch: Sri Lanka Living in Fear- Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka |
| 21 April 2004 | LTTE criticizes UNICEF over recent statements
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| 16 April 2004 | UNICEF confirms death of two child soldiers in LTTE fighting |
| 16 April 2004 | 'Don't re-recruit released underage LTTE cadres' -UNICEF |
| 13 April 2004 | Close to 150 child soldiers released by the LTTE |
| 13 April 2004 | LTTE hands over 269 cadres to their parents in Batticaloa |
| 21 March 2004 | LTTE hands over underage youths to UNICEF |
| 12 February 2004 | Tigers hand over underage members to UNICEF |
| 31 January 2004 | Ten youths from UNICEF list sent to Kilinochchi Transit Centre |
| 24 January 2004 | UNICEF underage list under review - LTTE |
| 17 October 2003 | Thirteen children released by LTTE in Batticaloa |
| 3 October 2003 | UNICEF opens transit centre for child soldiers freed by LTTE, |
| 2 October 2003 | Killinochchi children transit center opens |
| 13 September 2003 | LTTE hands over underage youths to parents in Akkaraipattu |
| 28 June 2003 | LTTE hands over seven underage youths to their parents |
| 11 April 2003 | Sri Lanka and LTTE agree on action plan for children |
| 31 March 2003 | UNICEF-LTTE agree to work to uplift war affected children |
| 27 January 2003 | LTTE hands over underage youths to parents through UNICEF |
| 31 January 2003 | Analysis: Sri Lanka's child soldiers - BBC |
| 11 September 2002 | 85 child recruits released to their families by the Liberation Tigers |
| 24 June 2002 | LTTE adopts UN policy on recruitment
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| 12 June 2002 | UNICEF officials negotiate with Sri Lankan rebels to release recruits |
| September 2000 | Unicef Sri Lanka Donor Update |
| 1998 | Children's Rights - Sri Lanka Case Study, Susan A Wolfson |
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