It Would Take a Long Time For The Sinhala South to Repent For What They Have Been Doing - Kusal Perera:

It Would Take a Long Time For The Sinhala South to Repent For What They Have Been Doing

By Kusal Perera

Far deep in the South, the Sinhala dominated Akuressa electorate in the Matara district with about 1,500 Muslims amongst a population of about 44,000 was completely shattered in a bloody orgy never before experienced and wholly undreamt of, just a week after the Buttala attack on security personnel in South Sri Lanka . In Akuressa, 06 government ministers together were participating in an Islamic celebration that marked the birth of Prophet Mohamed. Every one was perhaps taking the event rather casually.

The Southern social psyche that the war is almost over with the LTTE forced into a palm size patch of 20 sq km. in the Mullaitivu, left no reason not to feel casual. But that wasn't so, when a suicide cadre of the LTTE exploded himself on the morning of Tuesday (March 10) that was a poya day for the Buddhists. The attack killed 14 persons while injuring over 40 others. Ex JVP and UNP cross over MP Mahinda Wijesekera, presently Minister of Postal Services was airlifted to Colombo with serious injuries. Eye brows were raised in Colombo circles once again on the veracity of government claims of defeating the LTTE. It did happen that way after the two Zlin light planes freaked into the Colombo night skies three weeks before.

Yet the conflict lines remain clearly drawn and divided. At least ideologically they remain divided and that would decide the ground play in Sri Lankan politics, despite targeted suicide attacks. The South, the Sinhala polity in particular, would not believe this claim of war victory would leave a different conflict to deal with. Would not believe that this is only the end of the conventional phase of the armed conflict. They wouldn't accept that we would be leaving a rough terrain for a prolonged tactical war that would gradually seep into society in guerrilla form. Then it wouldn't matter whether that phase is led by Prabhakaran or the LTTE. It would nevertheless be organised again with the promise to liberate Tamil people, from a "racist Sinhala regime".

On the opposite side, the pro Eelamist camp wouldn't accept the military strategy of the LTTE, designed and carried out by Velupillai Prabhakaran in establishing an independent Tamil Ealam State which is now a shattered dream. They now prefer to project the humanitarian catastrophe into centre stage and hold the Rajapaksa regime at fault and therefore responsible for the unfolding human carnage.

They would not want to accept this bloody tragedy is the outcome of Prabhakaran's fatal miscalculation in allowing Rajapaksa to become the President by blocking over 400,000 Tamil votes. Prabhakaran, with his purely militaristic strategy in overriding politics, has given the Rajapaksa regime the legitimacy to dismantle democratic structures in society in the name of "defeating terrorism". In the name of defeating terrorism the Southern democratic forces that opposed the war, campaigned for power sharing and stood against violation of human rights are being ruthlessly silenced. That apart, the Eelam lobby would not want to believe the man who brought the Tamil cause to the world arena and made successive Sri Lankan governments to negotiate on the basis of a "Tamil homeland" in the North – East of Sri Lanka, is the same man who forfeited their future, allowed for a terror State in the South and is now fighting a desperate battle to survive as a guerrilla group.

This seems a knotty state of affairs for both extremists on either side of the battle lines. The war is being waged to a finish and the LTTE is seen folding up on one side, while the LTTE also continues to penetrate the defences in the South and strike where they wish, despite calls for surrender. For the pro-LTTE lobby, it is only a tactical withdrawal for a bigger comeback. The Sinhala South has always been happy living in fictional glory. Therefore they prefer to believe that all else would be simply fine after defeating the LTTE. Despite such wishful thinking on both sides, the ground reality is, this Rajapaksa regime can not go on squeezing the patch of LTTE occupied land for ever. This regime has to either call it "quits" or declare the "mission accomplished" asap and that's what they would try to do within the next fortnight or so.

And then the big question. What possibly could the post – Sinhalese /Tamil New Year period hold for Sri Lanka?

Within the Rajapaksa war campaign, they have started calling it the post-LTTE period already and some of the Colombo peace lobbyists too feel comfortable with that terminology. Within the war campaign there are two faculties of political lobbying with two different packages. The moderate of the two and therefore the saner, wants some form of devolution handed over to the Tamil people through a moderate Tamil leadership. They are probably thinking of the two ministers Devananda and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan and the veteran loner Anandasangaree to come up with a compromise that would not rock the Sinhala boat. They would tinker with the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in tying up a devolution package and the Delhi administration would then happily carry it around.

The other is by the hard-line campaigners who are really in the business of war, backed by the JHU stalwarts and using Karuna Amman for logistical support. Outside the regime, the JVP too backs this political thinking, wanting to retain some Sinhala votes for them at PC elections. The hard line group argues against any form of devolution and pose the question, if devolution is ultimately the answer, why did the government sacrifice over 12,000 lives in battle ? If devolution is the ultimate answer, they argue, that could have been done without sacrificing soldier lives. They instead say the war has proved the Sinhala State could now settle in with its own centralised "Unitary" form that could accommodate others, but without a claim for minority rights. For which their solution is to dissolve Tamil majority areas with Sinhala colonisation. No more "Tamil homeland" arguments and "majority Tamil areas" there after.

The counter argument is, such an end is not possible for two reasons. One, the war had to be waged to eliminate the LTTE that was always a hindrance to any solution offered and therefore the inevitable sacrifice of life. Two, if no form of devolution is offered, there would be enough political space left for another armed movement, which could even be more ruthless than the LTTE.

They both seem to carry that part of the story with them, which could give the answer with which they are comfortable to sit with. The reality is, the role played by the LTTE during the pre-war era has left an unfortunate vacuum in Tamil political leadership. It wasn't Tamil politics on the strength of democratic forces that brought pressure on SL governments to sit for negotiations. It was the military strength of the LTTE that pushed all governments into negotiations and the international community to reluctantly recognise the LTTE as a Tamil force to reckon with.

Therefore elimination of the LTTE leaves the Tamil polity without any democratic leadership, independent and strong enough to negotiate a justifiable end to the conflict. Defeating the LTTE in this brutal fashion also leaves a South without any democratic life and economic development too, under a stinking regime.

The story more or less begins with the Indo-SL Accord and the IPKF. All other Tamil armed groups that believed or was forced to believe the " Delhi promise" would deliver results, had to end up with the GoSL. They then gradually splintered and withered into smaller factions. Unable to play any political role within the Tamil society, they became totally dependent on the very "Sinhala" State they fought against. Such existence without doubt, leaves no respect or credibility, but gives leverage in using State power, being part of the government. Meanwhile the LTTE established itself as the military might of the Tamil liberation struggle.

On the other side, the LTTE's exaggerated commitment of being the only saviour of the Tamil people, allowed them to cow down the TNA to be the political articulator of their military strategy. This left a clear divide in Tamil political leadership, both in creating Tamil political ideology and in campaigning for a political solution. Those in the government became mouth pieces of Southern politics and had to oppose the LTTE. In opposing the LTTE, they had to renege on their own Tamil homeland concept that had unanimous acceptance after Thimpu discussions in 1986 that made the Thimpu Accord, the basis of all negotiations there after.

The only Tamil fire power that was able to force any government to a negotiating table has wiped out all alternative Tamil leaderships that could replace it. There in lies the basis of the hard line Sinhala argument that no devolution is necessary now. No Devananda, no Sangaree could force this government to draw up a devolution package. Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan without his nom de guerre Karuna Amman, has clearly told he is no more interested in any form of provincial power.

Turned into puppets of this government, all what these survivors could do is, stand by any fake solution the Rajapaksa hard liners would throw out using them as Tamil plums on a Sinhala cake. Delhi could claim it as their success and the Obama administration could marinate it, with their new definition of eradicating terrorism.

The Tamil society, completely uprooted from their living and left as permanent IDPs can not play any role in any attempt at finding a solution how ever mediocre it would be. The Colombo peace lobby would try walking a tight rope between a Rajapaksa solution and their devalued conscience. It would be back to square one, with a difference. The difference being that this "square one" would have a round authoritarian Sinhala State as stubborn as a Machiavellian pervert in deciding the future of not only the Tamil society, but all others as well.

Such would be the situation that could roll out in the future and most unfortunately, the moderates would be proved right on the long run with another outrage of armed militancy that would have good reason to mobilise in an environment that has no democratic space for dialogue and dissent. It would take a long time for the Sinhala South to repent for what they had been doing for the Tamils and for themselves too.

Posted by transCurrents on March 16, 2009 05:57 AM | P